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LAW & RACE

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
RACIST SPEECH AND EQUAL LIBERTY*
MARY ELLEN GALE**

I.

THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM AND THE FAILURE OF EDUCATION

Racism still haunts American life.' Like Banquo's ghost, it is
the silent witness at our national banquet, the "horrible shadow" 2
that should compel memory and remorse. But most white Americans don't see it.3 Like Macbeth's guests, we consume the feast and
* Copyright Mary Ellen Gale 1991.
** Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. A.B. 1962, Radcliffe College/
Harvard University;, J.D. 1971, Yale University. I am grateful to the American Civil Liberties Union's National Board of Directors, its Special Committee on the 1989 Biennial Resolution on Racist Speech, the Board of Directors of the ACLU of Southern California, and
lawyers from the three California ACLU affiliates (including Northern California and San
Diego) for inspiring me to reexamine the constitutional meaning of free expression. (I am a
member of both Boards and served on the Special Committee.) I also thank ACLU National
Legal Director john a. powell for sharing some of his materials for a Fall 1990 course at
Columbia Law School. None of these groups or individuals agrees with most of my perceptions and arguments; some of them disagree with all of them. It should become obvious that
my views diverge from ACLU policy in many respects. See infra notes 217-223, 242 (discussing ACLU policies). An earlier, shorter discussion of my views (which since evolved) appears
in Gale, On Curbing Racial Speech, 1 THE REsPONSIVE CosuNrrY 47 (Winter 1990-91).
2 Cf. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 267, 267 (1991) ("curse of racism continues to haunt the Nation"). I am unwilling to
relinquish the metaphor. Our articles are otherwise dissimilar.
2 W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBEtH, act III, sc. iv, 1. 106, at 73 (1623) (A.
Harbage ed. 1956).
- See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 321-23, 329-31 (1987).
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also
inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an
individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To
the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced us, we are all racists. At
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don't ask questions about those who are missing from the table.
Like Macbeth, even when we can see the specter admonishing us,
we are likely to disclaim responsibility.4 We read and forget reports
that suggest that the United States has enacted much of the tragedy predicted by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders twenty-two years ago, that we have become-even more
now than then-"two societies, one black, one white-separate and
unequal." 5 Too many white Americans-even those of us who parthe same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the
ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the
occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.
Id.; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("One wonders whether the majority [of the Supreme Court] still believes that
race discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was"); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1331, 1348 & n.66 (1988) (most white Americans do not believe that racism still denies
equal social and economic opportunities to blacks); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2327 (1989) (whites deny
reality of racism); Reeves, The Truth, Too Little Told, Is That There's Some Racism in All
Americans, L.A. Times, June 15, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (legal and political notions of colorblindness are "a sham designed to keep black people in their place" and to "freez[e] the
status quo. The Confederacy wanted about the same thing").
At least some cognitive and emotional dissonance is necessary for Americans not to
acknowledge the persistent reality of racism. See Fulwood, Attitudes on Minorities in Conflict, L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1991, at A13, col. 1. A poll taken by the University of Chicago's
National Opinion Research Center revealed that while whites claimed to support equal
rights and racial integration, they consistently reported negative attitudes, describing blacks
and other minorities as "more violence-prone, less hard-working, less intelligent, less likely
to be self-supporting and less patriotic than whites." Id. (quoting Tom W. Smith, senior
study director for center). A study done in Atlanta showed that similar prejudicial attitudes
among white business executives prevented minority businesses from getting private contracts. Id.
" W. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, II. 50-51, at 71. In exonerating himself, Macbeth
stated, "[T]hou canst not say I did it. Never shake/ Thy gory locks at me." Id.; cf. Lauter,
Civil Rights Bill Vetoed by Bush, L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 5 (quoting President
Bush's contention, in rejecting Civil Rights Act of 1990, that it would "introduce the destructive force of quotas into our nation's employment system").

" REPORT OF

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1

(paperback ed.

1968). Currently, almost half the black children in the United States live in families-often
with one parent who is nearly always female-with incomes below the poverty line. L.A.
Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at A20, col. 2 (reporting statistics gathered by Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in Washington, D.C.). Other recent studies have focused on the
distorted lives of black men: black males in inner-city ghettos are more likely to die young
than if they lived in Bangladesh; young black males in California are three times more likely
to be murdered than to be admitted to the University of California; the murder rate for
black males aged 15 to 25 is 10 times that of white males in the same age group. Harris,
NAACP Seeks Solutions to Crisis of Black Males, L.A. Times, July 10, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
One third of California's black males in their twenties-and nearly one fourth of the same

1991]

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

ticipated in the civil rights movement of the 1960's and still identify ourselves as liberals e -have abandoned racial equality as an
urgent social goal. We no longer share radical dreams of equal participation, opportunity, and respect in public and private life. Perhaps we have turned our attention to other compelling societal
problems or sought nourishment, challenge, and satisfaction in our
private lives instead. Or perhaps we have settled for an uneasy social peace as a substitute for equal choices and equal rights. We
group nationwide-are incarcerated, on parole, or on probation. Ford, Prison Life, Parole
Touch High Number of Young Blacks, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1990, at A3, col. 6. As of December, 1990, 28.7% of the U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf were persons of color, more than two
and a half times larger than their percentage of the national population. Kempton, Again,
'Losers' Will Do Our Dirty Work, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at B5, col. 1 (citing Defense
Department estimate). See generallyD. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTnCE 45-49 (1987) (describing current status of blacks in United States); Bell,
The Supreme Court 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REV.
4, 9-13 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Chronicles] (exploring myths serving as basis for civil rights
inaction); Crenshaw, supra note 3 (analyzing continuing role of racism in subordination of
black Americans).
6 Writing this Article has made me wonder whether I still may be considered a "liberal." For a more traditionally liberal statement of my views on free expression, see Gale &
Strossen, The Real ACLU, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161 passim (1989) (defending ACLU
against Andrea Dworkin's charge of anti-feminism), and Dworkin, The ACLU: Bait and
Switch, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 37 passim (1989) (claiming ACLU is anti-feminist). I leave
it to the reader to decide whether my two articles are consistent.
Throughout this Article, I will use the term "rights" just as though I believed unequivocally in some clear conception of them and in its moral and legal power. See generally
R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 379-99 (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (paperback ed. 1978) [hereinafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. In fact, however, my attitude is similar to Professor Alan Freeman's (though I wouldn't use the same words to describe it):
"rights [are] a problematic, yet persistent, notion that plays a key role in the neverending
dialectic of politics and power." Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity:A CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 315 (1988). Professor
Freeman concedes the "power of rights rhetoric and belief as a source of imagery and inspiration," id. at 335, and observes, "I believe simultaneously in the truth of rights critique and
the authenticity of rights experiences," id. at 334-35. To some extent at least, this Article is
intended to contribute to what Freeman describes as an ongoing project to " 'unthink' domination"-even though that won't "make it go away." Id. at 323. For rights critique from a
different perspective, see J. ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
43-70 (1980) (rejecting tradition as a source of fundamental constitutional values).
With respect to the use of racial discrimination to disfavor minorities, our country
has two conflicting traditions: the egalitarian one to which most official documents
have paid lip service over the past century, and the quite different and malevolent
one that in fact has characterized much official and unofficial practice over the
same period (and certainly before). Presumably no reader would wish to endorse
the latter tradition, but I'd be interested to hear the argument that can make it go
away.
Id. at 61 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Nonetheless, I am not an uncritical student of critical legal studies ("CLS"). For one
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may know that black Americans 8 too often have none of these, but
we comfort ourselves that in our own lives and communities, we
still value, seek, and sometimes find them.
One place that we expect to find them is in our educational
institutions, idealized as a refuge for the calm, impartial, and unimpeded pursuit of knowledge and truth. Here we hope to escape
the bigotry, cruelty, and injustice outside. But universities and colleges are no longer, if they ever were, tranquil havens in a
prejudiced world. Instead, for people of color, women, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, and members of other arbitrarily disadvantaged groups, 9 institutions of higher education have become, inthing, some CLS authors too often get the facts wrong. Freeman himself uncritically reports
the contention that "white activists in the 1960's who showed up in the South ready to
'organize' black communities" were told by the blacks who lived there to "go home and
organize their own communities instead." See Freeman, supra, at 322 n.76. No doubt that
was the experience of some, especially those who thought they were attending an inchoate
CLS conference. But those who came to listen, learn, and record the civil rights movement-or who offered respect, belief, and help for longer than summer vacation-found a
complex, if conditional, welcome that changed some of our lives forever (here I speak for
myself; I helped to edit a civil rights newspaper in Alabama from 1965 to 1968). Many
volunteers who came to Mississippi only for the historic summer of 1964 were organized
themselves by black and white leaders into an effective cadre of civil rights workers. See,

e.g., S.

BELFRAGE, FREEDOM SUMMER

327 (1965). This Article also reflects my experiences as

a civil rights activist-the instilled belief that, against all the odds of prejudice and misunderstanding, interracial cooperation and racial justice remain possible.
' In this paragraph, and in this Article generally, I focus on white racism directed at
black Americans as a paradigm for prejudice and as the most serious national problem,
though I also refer to other prejudices. Cf. Reeves, supra note 3 (other ethnic prejudice is
less fundamental). But I realize that other people of color, women, gays and lesbians, and
members of religious minorities suffer similar-though not identical-harms from arbitrary
stigma and prejudice. See Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordinationof Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, 116 & n.83 ("every group subordination
rests on a distinct legitimizing myth" accepted by the dominant culture-racial inferiority
of blacks, reduction of women to sexual and maternal objects, and rejection of gay and lesbian sexuality as unnatural). But see Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?,1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 492 & n.30 (harms caused by racist speech do not
differ from harms caused by sexist or homophobic speech in conveying messages of, respectively, white, male, and heterosexual supremacy). These contradictory observations each
seem partly true, thus suggesting how complex and elusive the psychological, social, and
political realities of prejudice may be.
' Like everyone who writes about racism and similar forms of prejudice, I have struggled to find adequate words or short phrases to refer to the target groups. "Minorities" is
empirically inaccurate and socially marginalizing. See Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdeals From DeconstructedRights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 404 n.4 (1987)
(discussing characterization difficulties). "People of color," now becoming accepted, may
sound too much like the discredited "colored people" to some readers. "Historically disadvantaged" may exclude both persons with AIDS, and those gays and lesbians who pass for
heterosexual rather than suffer the often legally approved mistreatment. It may also imply
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creasingly, places of physical and psychological danger. Statistics,
news reports, and personal stories recounted by the victims disclose that racist, sexist, and other prejudiced incidents have flared
on college campuses across the United States. 10 When the perpetrators are identified, they often turn out to be white male students, asserting their assumptions of power and privilege against
the claims of others to equal educational rights and opportunities
and to equal participation in university life.11
not just the dominance but the superiority of white culture over others. See Monture, KaNin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah, 2 CAN. J. WOMEiN's L. RJFD 159, 161-62 (1986).

For Native American cultures which emphasize spiritual rather than material values,
"[d]isadvantage is a nice, soft, comfortable word to describe dispossession.... a situation of
force whereby our very existence, our histories, are erased continuously right before our
eyes. Words like disadvantage conceal racism." Id. Nonetheless I sometimes use these terms.
"Black," the term I use, has different nuances from "African-American." See Crenshaw,
supra note 3, at 1332 n.2. Even my choice not to capitalize "black" can be viewed as a
manifestation of white racism. See id.; cf. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559,
1565-66 (1989) (dozens of minute cultural cues combine to reinforce stereotype of blacks as
inferior). But see Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 586 n.20 (1990) (race and gender issues entwine; "to capitalize 'Black' and not
'Woman' would imply a privileging of race with which I do not agree").

10E.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, ADL CONFERENCE ON CAMPUS
PREJUDICE 7-8 (1990) [hereinafter ADL CONFERENCE REPORT]; France, Hate Goes to College,
76 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (July 1990) (discussing incidents); Koepke, The University of California
Hate Speech Policy: A Good Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12 HASTINGS COMM./ENT. L.J. 599,
602 n.12 (1990) (citing reports of incidents at Columbia University, Dartmouth College,
Duke University, Purdue University, University of California at Los Angeles, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, University of Michigan, University of New Mexico, University of
Wisconsin, and Wellesley College); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 431-33 (listing incidents); Matsuda, supra note 3,
at 2320-21, 2327-38 (describing incidents and citing studies); Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295, 315-16 (1990) (same); Temkin, Times of Tension, Brown Alumni Monthly, June/July 1989, at 24 (exploring incidents and responses at
Brown University); Lessons from Bigotry 101, NEwswEEK, Sept. 25, 1989, at 48 (citing study
that documents racial incidents at 250 colleges since fall of 1986).
" See, e.g., Butterfield, The Uproar at Dartmouth: How a Conservative Weekly Inflamed a Campus, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1990, § 1, at 26, col. 1. The Dartmouth Review, an
off-campus newspaper edited primarily by conservative white males, has run columns promoting various forms of prejudice since its inception in 1981. Id. For instance, one column
suggested that black students were illiterate; another, describing a black professor of music
as "look[ing] like a used Brillo pad," urged students to harass him; the most recent incident
involved the publication on a Jewish holiday of an anti-Semitic quotation from Adolf Hitler.
Id.; see also Lawrence, supra note 10, at 431 (white fraternity members painted themselves
black and placed rings in their noses for "jungle parties" at University of Michigan); Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 2128, 2133 (1989) (after black Stanford student's observation that Beethoven had some
black ancestry, white students "got drunk and decided to color a poster of Beethoven to
represent a black stereotype" and posted it outside black student's room (citing Board of
Trustees, Stanford Univ., Final Report on Recent Incidents at Ujamaa House (1989)));
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The xenophobic prejudices that cause such incidents intertwine like strands of rope, reinforcing each other and doubly victimizing people perceived as doubly distanced from the white male
heterosexual Christian center of American consciousness: AfricanAmerican or Asian-American women, gay blacks, Jewish women,
Native Americans who embrace their own religions, Arab-American Muslims, and more. Yet racism in its most native version-hatred, subordination, and prejudice directed by whites
against the descendants of the black people whom earlier white
Americans enslaved-seems the most pervasive and ineradicable of
all. 12 Sexism in its most virulent form-male contempt, dominance,
and devaluing of women-contributes equally to social oppression
and is, in some respects, more deeply rooted in our individual
psyches, our community values, and our social, legal, and economic
systems. 13 But racism provides the deep structures for most manifestations of prejudice in our society. 4 Our Constitution as originally written relied on the political silence and insignificance of all
women as a contextual certainty, 5 but its framers deliberately
Note, supra note 10, at 315-16 n.76 (white students wearing sheets burned cross in black
student's room at The Citadel, South Carolina military college (citing Aitken, Racism on
Campus: Beyond the Citadel, PEOPLE MAO., Dec. 15, 1986, at 58)).
12 See generally D. BELL, supra note 5; Bell, Chronicles, supra note 5, at 4-7 (discussing Constitution's pro-slavery orientation and its harsh effect on blacks); Williams, SpiritMurdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger-Pointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987) (discussing effects of whites' exclusion of blacks
from society).
" See generally H. KAY, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 1-49
(1988) (discussing traditional and modern roles of women in society); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 41 (1987) [hereinafter C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] (social relation between sexes organized so men dominate and women
submit); C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3-80 (1989); D. RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER 9-28 (1989) (male and female roles largely separate and unequal); Was-

serstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 589-91 (1977) (sexism is "more deeply embedded in the culture" and
"less unequivocally regarded as unjust and unjustifiable" than racism).
"' But see C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 8-9 (gender inequality, though unlike racial inequality, is just as pervasive and invidious); Bohlen, East
Europe's Women Struggle With New Rules, and Old Ones, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1990, § 4
(Week in Review), at 1, col. 1 (describing exclusion of women from power in new "male
democracies" of Eastern Europe, documenting repressive anti-abortion movements, and
quoting Hungarian women's leader: "Without abortion, women are slaves").
'0 I do not mean to let the framers off lightly for that reason. The exclusion of women
from our nation's "constituting document" and its primary concern with limiting state
rather than private action have combined to ensure "that those domains in which women
are distinctively subordinated are assumed by the Constitution to be the domain of freedom." C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 207.
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chose to inflict the pain and degradation of slavery upon black men
and women. 16 From that willed compromise flowed much of our
national experience; it has divided our consciousness and flawed
our hearts ever since.
Only with that acknowledgment, it seems to me, can white liberals even begin to talk intelligibly and constructively about racist
and sexist incidents on college campuses and about the challenge
that they pose to our traditional conceptions of free speech as
guaranteed by the first amendment. Without that acknowledgment, our voices blend too easily with those who raise the first
amendment as a shield for bigotry.1 7 If we expect the victims of
16 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (apportioning representatives among states "by adding to the whole Number of free Persons... three fifths of all other Persons"); id. § 9, cl. 1
("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight"); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour
in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due"); cf. D. BELL,
supra note 5, at 26-42 (chronicling attempts of modern black female civil rights attorney,
magically transported back to Constitutional Convention, to persuade delegates not to endorse slavery); Bell, Chronicles, supra note 5, at 7 n.9 (listing 10 original constitutional
provisions that effectively preserved slavery); Williams, supra note 12, at 138 ("Blacks were,
by constitutional mandate, outlawbd from the hopeful, loving expectations that being
treated as a whole, rather than three-fifths of a human being can bring").
17 But see Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. RV.
979, 990 (1990) ("The great paradox for this country... is why our own past of slavery and
segregation does not create the problem of tacit approval in the toleration of racist speech");
Linzer, White Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 187, 242 & n.249
(1991) ("When the government or a university allows racist speech to be uttered, it is not
approving it or adopting it"); STANFORD UNivERSrrY, FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATON: FREE ExPRESSION AND DISCRIMINATORY HARssMENT, at 4 (June 1990) [hereinafter
STANFORD INTERPRErATION] ("Free expression could not survive if institutions were held implicitly to endorse every kind of speech that they did not prohibit").
Even thovgh I would not restrict racist or other prejudiced speech unless it crosses the
(sometimes fuzzy) line to become discriminatory harassment of particular individuals, see
infra notes 218-22, 235-43 and accompanying text, I think that official tolerance of racist
speech legitimates racism and trivializes its harms far more often than Professors Bollinger
and Linzer suppose. Professor Linzer actually compares "minorities [who] complain about
theories they don't like" with members of "the Spanish Inquisition [who] harassed Galileo
over Copernican astronomy." Linzer, supra, at 214. This absurd historical analogy inverts
the true power relationships involved by equating today's victims of racist speech with the
seventeenth century's hegemonic perpetrators of religious orthodoxy. In the context of
Linzer's discussion of the "victim system," id. at 213, it also implies that white racism and
male sexism are less serious causes of inequality than self-destructive attitudes ascribed to
minorities and women-a theory that conveniently relieves the beneficiaries of racism and
sexism from responsibility. Cf. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1614-15
(1986) (persons within hierarchical organizations may discard conscience and autonomy to
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prejudice to enter into a dialogue about how to restructure our
public and private values to fulfill constitutional guarantees of free
speech and equal rights, 18 we need to abandon the self-righteous
condescension of much liberal rhetoric, 9 and begin again.
We need also to acknowledge that the new incidents of
prejudice at American universities reveal an unsettling truth about
our educational system and its institutions: they have failed to instill the most important of democratic beliefs-in the equal value
and humanity of people different from ourselves and in the universal right to self-respect and self-realization. Perhaps that is not
their task,20 but it is difficult to identify other social institutions
follow not just commands but even interpretive signals from institutional authorities). See

generally Davis, supra note 9, at 1560 (black inferiority is background assumption of institutional neutrality); Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 135-36 (1982) (racial insults demean victims by equating distinctions of race with distinctions of merit, dignity, status, and
personhood); Williams, supra note 11, at 2137-42 (examining cases of "analytic paradigm"
equating white with good and black with bad).
Oddly, Bollinger thinks that toleration of obscenity and "fighting words" "is too
freighted with messages of weakness and condonation" to claim first amendment protection.
See Bollinger, supra. I cannot even imagine a scheme of personal or community values in
which either fighting words or obscenity ranks as a greater evil than, for example, the Ku
Klux Klan's thinly euphemized call for racial genocide.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (equal protection clause).
Despite their evident sincerity, many liberals tend to phrase their views as instruction for the less enlightened. See, e.g., Gunther, Should Universities Restrict Expression
That Is Racist or Otherwise Denigrating?Two Views... No, STAN. LAW., Spring 1990, at 7
(despite suffering from anti-Semitic remarks in Nazi Germany as a child, "[t]he lesson I
have drawn ... is the need to walk the sometimes difficult path of denouncing the bigots'
hateful ideas with all my power, yet at the same time challenging any community's attempt
to suppress hateful ideas by force of law"); Kaufman, Nibble at Freedom, and Risk Losing
It All, L.A. Times, July 31, 1990, at B7, col. 4 ("Justice Holmes explained and history has
taught us, in the long run, the best answer to 'bad' speech is more and better speech, not
new laws, litigation and repression").
20 As academic controversies over affirmative action, the literary canon, multiculturalism, and the "politically correct" position demonstrate, people disagree about whether universities should embrace attempts to rectify social injustice and inequality or cling instead
and only to conventional education in "a disinterested Western cultural tradition, rooted in
a commitment to rational inquiry and converging, century by century, on the truth." See A
Campus Forum on Multiculturalism: Opening Academia Without Closing It Down, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 1990, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5, col. 1 (quoting introductory paragraph of
recent collection of differing opinions from 10 scholars). Defenders of the "disinterested tradition" deride proponents of more inclusive multicultural studies as purveyors of a "politically correct" orthodoxy. See, e.g., Taking Offense, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48; Bernstein, The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, § 4 (Week
in Review), at 1, col. 1; Bernstein, The Arts Catch Up With a Society in Disarray,N.Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1990, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. 1. Few traditionalists seem willing to
acknowledge that heterosexual white males of indeterminate or mainstream ethnic origin
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that can accomplish it. Moreover, because the new prejudice is so
often expressed primarily or exclusively in damning, demeaning,
and damaging words; it starkly challenges the liberal faith that free
expression reinforces equal opportunity and equal rights. To civil
rights and civil liberties activists, therefore, it suggests something
even more troubling: that our constitutional theory of government
may be fundamentally inadequate to achieve the ideals of liberty
and equality that it proclaims.2 1
Free speech-as conventionally conceived and defended in
2
been an extraordinarily powerful device for
this century 2"-has
still benefit from what might be called "reverse affirmative action"-the dominant cultural
assumption that they are naturally more capable and deserving than such stigmatized "outsiders" as gays, blacks, and women.
21 Professor Burt Neuborne, former National Legal Director of the ACLU, described
the dilemma to the Anti-Defamation League's National Conference on Campus Prejudice:
What does one do if one is both passionately committed to free expression ... and
-. . to the goals of equality that both the Constitution and a modem and decent
civilized community demand of us? ...

...We start with a conflict between two foundational principles: ... there is
no such thing as a forbidden idea .... [and that] everybody, regardless of race,
regardless of religion, regardless of ethnic background, everybody is entitled to
enjoy an equal shot at getting a good education at the school .... [W]hen...
[hateful] ideas get expressed in ways that prevent identifiable segments of the
educational community from having an equal chance at getting an education, then
there is a reason for being concerned about the speech and for trying to deal with
it. And that means, for me at least, trying desperately not to be put in a position
to have to choose between the two. I don't want to choose between free speech
and equality.
ADL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21 (emphasis in original); cf. Grey, Civil Rights
vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of DiscriminatoryVerbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHL. & POL. 81
passim (Spring 1991) (hereinafter cited to January 1991 manuscript on file with St. John's
Law Review). Professor Grey argues that civil rights and civil liberties views of discriminatory verbal harassment are "mutually incommensurable perspectives-not the poles of a
well defined continuum along which negotiators may approach each other in search of a
solution, that measurably splits the difference between them," although he proposes an "accommodat[ion]." Id. at 16-17 n.27. But cf. Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2321 (we need to "mediate[] between different ways of knowing in order to determine what is true and what is
just").

22 Although first amendment partisans sometimes contend that it has strongly shielded
free speech from government restriction for all 200 years of its existence, see Kaufman,
supra note 19, the facts are otherwise. There was no significant first amendment jurisprudence in the Supreme Court until this century, and no significant doctrine that marked
speech for special protection until Louis Brandeis, Zechariah Chafee, and Oliver Wendell
Holmes began creating it in the World War I era. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J., for unanimous Court) (formulating "clear and present
danger" test as dividing line between protected and unprotected political expression). See
generally A. BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS IN THE
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reinventing our nation and ourselves. It has rescued us from
majoritarian oppression, self-delusion, and ignorance, and disentangled us time and again from history's and our own mistakes.
But the persistence of racism, despite the general acceptance of
liberal theories of free speech, overwhelmingly suggests that it can
neither save us nor free us from the constitutional sin of slavery
and its legacy of racial subordination-nor from the similar forms
of prejudice they also have served to legitimate. To renew our national commitment to equal justice under the law, now we must
reimagine the first amendment itself.
In this Article, I try to begin that formidable task by focusing
on the problematic relationship between the governing ideals of
free expression and the incidents of resurgent racist, sexist, and
other prejudiced speech on the college campus. In Part II, I describe the heroic ideal of the first amendment and its theoretical
justification. In Part III, I examine the failure of the heroic ideal
and its traditional defenses, contending that in the real world it
privileges the liberty of some at the expense of the liberty and
equality of others. In Part IV, I investigate equality-based approaches to the first amendment and propose an alternative that
recognizes differences in political power and personal experience as
relevant, though not necessarily dispositive, in determining
whether government authorities may regulate racist or similarly
prejudiced speech. I ground this approach partly in the complex
interplay between the first and fourteenth amendments. In Part V,
I apply this perspective to the problem of prejudiced speech on the
college campus, and attempt to distinguish between protected expression and discriminatory harassment.

II.

THE HEROIC IDEAL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Simply stated, the heroic ideal of the first amendment is the
SUPREME COURT 157-66 (1974) (Court treatment of free speech during World War I); Blasi,

Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the FirstAmendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLo. L. REV. 1 , 11-16 (1990) (describing contributions of Hand,
Chafee, Holmes, and Brandeis to development of first amendment doctrine); Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARv. L. REV. 932 passim (1919) (discussing wartime aspects of freedom of speech); Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 1205, 1244 (1983) (discussing Selective Service Draft Law and
Espionage Act decisions of Court). Judge Learned Hand also contributed to the early development of the distinction between words protected because they are mere "keys of persuasion" and words unprotected because they act as "triggers of action." Masses Publishing Co.
v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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hope and the belief, translated into constitutional theory, that unfettered speech will both satisfy our deepest human longings and
produce a better society-more free, more just, and more
equal-than any system of regulation that is within our ability to
design and enforce.2 It is heroic because it demands that we display strength and courage,24 take risks, and suffer pains to fulfill
its promise, and it is an ideal because its justification rests not so
much on the discontinuous, disempowered, and flawed moral selves
that we concretely experience in the flow of real life25 as on an
imagined model or archetype of the free person, integral, bold, active, and in control of his (or possibly her26) destiny.
The heroic ideal is a compromise among many core values of
our version of democracy, including tolerance, diversity, and equality, but it most strongly expresses the thrust toward liberty and
individualism that (at least ostensibly 7 ) characterizes American
23 Cf. Schauer, The Second-Best FirstAmendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 2, 11-22
(1989) (arguing that justified distrust of government decision-makers leads to free speech
jurisprudence characterized by formal rules that preclude regulation even when considerations of equity and justice might otherwise favor it). Schauer includes "cases ... that protect racial epithets and other racist speech" among examples "in which direct application of
the reasons behind the protection of freedom of speech could well have yielded the opposite
result." Id. at 12 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (invalidating conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader who denounced Jews and blacks and suggested
taking some (unclear) action against them, because statute under which he was prosecuted
was not limited to "advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce sucl action")).
2 But cf. Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadianand American
Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUFFALO L. Rzv. 337, 354-55 (1988/89) (remarks of
Jamie Cameron) (criticizing "First Amendment Romanticism," including the idea that "protect[ing] freedom of expression [is] an act of courage," and arguing that American courts too
often defer to "the power of intimidation" in protecting racist speech instead of its victims).
2' For a powerful description of the complexities of moral consciousness, and of its uneven ebb and flow in response to particular incidents, see Williams, supra note 11, at 214451.
26 The perfect individual speaker invoked by the heroic ideal seems almost certainly
gendered and male. If you doubt this, try imagining her pregnant. (This comment is not
meant to suggest either that pregnancy defines women or that it interferes with cognitive
activity or intellectual passion. The incongruity, if any, between pregnancy and individualism is beyond my capacity to explore in this Article.) Nevertheless, some courageous women
are prominent figures in first amendment history. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 379 (1927) (upholding conviction of Anita Whitney for membership in organization that
advocated "criminal syndicalism"). For an invigorating account both of Whitney's life (tribute to traditional first amendment values) and of Justice Brandeis' famous concurrence in
the Supreme Court, see Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 653, 656-63, 666-82,
696-97 & n.148 (1988).
217Despite the romantic stories we tell ourselves about the conquering power of individ-
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life and the concomitant suspicion of majoritarian government that
(at least potentially) constricts individual freedom. It springs from
a particular blend of optimism and pessimism about human nature
and social organization. It both trusts and distrusts individuals to
experience freedom as self-realization, power, and pleasure, to celebrate it joyously but not heedlessly, and to use it rationally and
wisely to pursue individual and common goals. It embodies both
the visionary hope that the aggregate of individual choices to engage in free expression will combine harmoniously and progressively to benefit the nation, and the practical suspicion that such
choices instead will often clash discordantly, threatening individual
freedom, community 28 relationships, and social order. It acknowlual consciousness in a free society, an observer might focus instead on orthodoxy, conformity, and prejudice against outsiders as more accurately descriptive of the way most of us
actually conduct our lives.
28 By "community" I intend a general reference to a wide range of intermediate social
institutions, formal and informal, including the family in all its modern forms, the neighborhood, the school or college, the network of friends and co-workers, the workplace or job or
profession itself, and the voluntary association, which provide us with our immediate social
context. These are to be contrasted with the larger and more remote city, state, and nation,
which are the political forms in which we interact both as individuals and usually as members of one or more communities.
Membership in groups identified by particular characteristics, such as gender, race, religion, disability, poverty, homelessness, or social or political interests may or may not signify
relationship to a community of similar persons. We belong to some communities, such as
birth families, more by chance than by choice, and to others by choice alone (e.g., the
ACLU). What they have in common for my purpose here is that they are the contexts
within which we enter into relationships with others, and where we are most likely first to
test our ideas and feelings.
Their relationship to the first amendment is problematic; most analysts would probably
define most of these "communities" as involving private interaction, generally fenced off
from government protection of or interference with free expression, yet paradoxically they
are the places and networks within which we construct much if not all of our personal and
social identities, which directly affect how we participate as citizens in democratic self-government. But cf. Post, supra note 1, at 284 (democratic state cannot coercively form the
individual choices it combines into state policy without undermining defining characteristic
of self-determination).
Some of these communities are directly connected to the government: public elementary and secondary schools, public colleges and universities, public employers. To all of
these the first amendment plainly applies, although not in precisely the same way. See, e.g.,
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) (high school officials may
censor student newspaper articles about divorce and teenage pregnancy on grounds they do
not meet journalistic standards); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (public employee's rights to free expression in workplace extend only to matters of public concern);
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871
(1982) (public school officials may remove books from school library if motivated by educational unsuitability or pervasive vulgarity but not if motivated by dislike for ideas expressed). But see, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16
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edges our need to explore the unknown thoughts and passions
within us, to give them shapes and names and to test them in our
immediate communities and the world beyond, to give them wild,
true, and free expression-while appealing to our domesticated intellects, our reasonable, socially constructed selves, to control our
expressive responses for our own and the common good.
Despite the many doctrinal differences in first amendment
theory and practice that have emerged over the last seventy years,
courts, scholars, and commentators frequently have resorted to the
heroic ideal to justify the harms that free expression can inflict on
individuals, groups, and society. Some of the liberal reluctance to
take those harms seriously today stems from the fear that we have
forgotten first amendment history and may therefore condemn
ourselves to repeat it. Before World War I, courts treated freedom
of speech as merely one of several constitutional claims to individual liberty, no more important than any other and no less limitable
by majoritarian agreement and common perceptions of the social
good.29 Perhaps the greatest liberating achievement of free speech
theorists from World War I through the Warren Court era, which
persisted by a bare majority in the 1989-90 Supreme Court term,3"
is entrenchment of the notion that "hostile criticism"3 1 of the government is entitled to special protection from government regulation or suppression.
(1979) (first amendment precludes discharging public school teacher for challenging school
board policies as racially discriminatory); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (first amendment precludes disciplining student for wearing
black armband as nondisruptive anti-war protest).
29 See Blasi, supra note 22, at 11-12.
[J]udges experienced little difficulty restricting speech in circumstances in which
the speaker's words could plausibly be thought to lead to harm, either to other
individuals or to the society as a whole. The measure of what harms could be
considered in this calculus and how seriously they must be threatened in order to
limit individual liberty was the same measure applied to disputes that pitted
other liberties against other claims of individual or collective well-being. Speech
was not thought to be special .... [It] could be restricted when it might lead to
bad consequences in the form of individual or social harms. The likelihood of such
consequences need not be high. The time frame within which the speech might
produce the consequences need not be short.
Id. at 12.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 2409-10 (1990) (reaffirming by
same five-to-four majority the ruling in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989), that first
amendment invalidates government prohibition of burning United States flag because it is
expressive conduct critical of government).
21 Blasi, supra note 22, at 12 & n.54 (citing Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535,
540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)).
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Libertarians who oppose any (or nearly any) regulation of
prejudiced speech often cite the founding fathers of this major
strand of first amendment doctrine as well as later Supreme Court
decisions that built upon those foundations. 2 Both sources provide
some stirring tributes to the values of free expression. Alexander
Meiklejohn, endorsing political dissent, wrote that "[t]o be afraid
of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government."3 3 Justice
Holmes, dissenting when the Court affirmed the Espionage Act
convictions of defendants who tossed anti-war leaflets into a New
York crowd, described free expression as "an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
3' 4
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
Justice Black, echoing another line from Holmes, argued that
"freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly ... must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied
to the ideas we cherish."' 5 Justice Brandeis declared:
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent
that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.
If there be time to expose.., the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. 6
Justice Douglas observed that "a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."' 37 The second Justice Harlan defended free expression because it
put[s] the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into
the hands of each of us, in the hope that the use of such freedom
32

See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 17, at 205-06, 241 & n.247; Strossen, supra note 8, at

501, 514 n.150.
31 A. MEIKLEJOHN, FRE

SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27

(1948), re-

printed in POLITIcAL FRREDoM 28 (1960) (arguing that speakers must be equally free to
praise or condemn Constitution, and, even during war, to support or to oppose military
conscription or war itself).
" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting); see United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.3 8
Justice Brennan upheld the right to burn one's own American flag
to express political dissent, even if the flames may char the nation's social fabric as well:
The First Amendment does not guarantee that other concepts
virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole-such as the principle
that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive-will go unquestioned in the marketplace of ideas.... We
decline, therefore, to create for the flag an exception to the joust
of principles protected by the First Amendment.3"
Yet these statements and the decisions they support (or, in
the case of dissents, would have supported) may not actually justify invalidating any government regulation of prejudiced speech.
Although they extend the freedom to express one's thoughts without fear of government retaliation, they ultimately may derive not
from postulates about individual liberty but from the theory, advocated most strongly by Professor Meiklejohn, that free speech is
necessary to self-governance.4 0 If citizens are to rule effectively, the
argument runs, they cannot delegate to public officials the power
to control criticism of the government. If they were to delegate
that power, they would reallocate sovereignty from themselves to
their agents and thereby lose the essential continuing capacity to
redetermine their political course. "Truth must be constructed by
a decentralized process that is capable of responding to a changing
world."'" Thus "[tihe self-government theory is based on a concept
of sovereignty, not a particular vision of political justice."42
When freedom of speech is viewed as a source of democratic
legitimacy rather than as an individual right, "the harm principle
that limits individual liberties may not be applicable to disputes
3'Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
3'Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2546 (1989) (citation omitted). The "joust" metaphor aptly illustrates the heroic ideal: the subtextual image is that of English knights (white
upper-class males) on horseback, armed with lances, and engaged in deadly or sporting
combat.
"0See generally Blasi, supra note 22, at 28-36 (describing how self-government theory
has influenced first amendment doctrine).
41 Id. at 23 (describing Holmes' opinion in Abrams as application of self-government
theory of first amendment).
42 Id. at 14.
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over the regulation of speech. ' 43 If self-government genuinely requires certain freedoms of expression, then the argument is over.
Even if some harmful consequences flow from particular types or
instances of free speech, they must be accepted to maintain the
constituting framework of our society. The definition of harm itself
changes; some consequences that might count as harms to be
weighed against the importance of free speech as an individual liberty do not count-or have no weight-when free speech is viewed
as a necessary condition of self-government. 44 Justice Brennan's
opinions for the Court in the two recent flag-burning cases45 provide a clear example. Despite the flag's importance as a symbol of
national ideals and national unity, and the "deep[] offensive[ness]"
of flag desecration to many citizens,48 the Court refused to weigh
potential social, psychological, or emotional harms to the nation, to
the local community, or to the individual onlookers in its judicial
scales; instead it declared, "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable. 4 7 Hostile criticism of the government-and by extension, of the society we have created
through self-government-must remain free.
Justice Brennan equated "virulent ethnic and religious epithets ' 48 with flag desecration in describing his "bedrock principle."
Most civil libertarians would agree. But if the central explanation
of the first amendment is the preservation of self-government, the
equation may not hold. Flag desecration, though expressive conduct rather than pure speech, nonetheless is at its core "hostile
,-Id. at 13; cf. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204,
213-14, 221 (1972) [hereinafter Scanlon, A Theory] (arguing that certain harms-such as
false beliefs and acts based upon those beliefs-caused by expressive acts cannot be counted
as justification for government restriction because of "limitation of the authority of states to
command their subjects" and requirement that government treat us each as rational, autonomous moral agent). But see Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression,
40 U. Pirr. L. REv. 519, 530-34 (1979) (partially recanting, on grounds that his original
theory was incomplete, because it over-valued audience interests and under-valued participant interests, did not explain why free expression should receive special protection, and
minimized importance of rights and of distributive justice).
, See Blasi, supra note 22, at 13.
' United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533
(1989).
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2410.
Id. (citing Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544).
48 Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)); see supra note 39 and accompanying text (quoting Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546, endorsing dissemination of racist ideas).
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criticism" of the government. Ethnic and religious epithets generally are not. (The comparison would be more persuasive if Justice
Brennan had focused on racist speech that, for example, expresses
opposition to equal employment laws or government-imposed requirements for affirmative action.) The speaker in Terminiello v.
Chicago,4 9 the case cited by Justice Brennan, was not criticizing
the government but denouncing Communists and Jews. Restricting
his speech impinged not-or not so much 5 0 -on the central democratic experience of self-government as on his individual liberty.51
The reply to this argument is well-known. Civil libertarians reject Meiklejohn's self-government theory of the first amendment as
too narrow, and contend instead that the first amendment enacts a
broader protection of individual liberty as "bedrock principle."
But while rejecting the limitations of the self-government theory,
libertarian theorists seek to retain its expansions of free
speech-in particular, its uncompromising justification of harms to
individuals, groups, or society that might otherwise count as reasons to limit free speech understood as a function of individual
liberty.5 2 Invoking the heroic ideal of the first amendment, liberals
4- 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
50 1 recognize the force of the possible argument that restricting any speech, not just
hostile criticism of government or society, limits self-government by diminishing the flow of
ideas or the appeals to emotion that may affect the choices we make as self-governors. That
argument, however, collapses or at least undermines the distinction between the self-government theory and the individual liberty theory of the first amendment. If the two theories
combine into one, it still may require an independent justification for the refusal to consider
the harmful consequences of free speech.
"1But see Blasi, supra note 22, at 30-33 (analyzing Justice Douglas' opinion for Terminiello majority as based strongly on the theory that even vituperative speech contributes to
self-governance).
52 Cf. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7-8 (1982).
When a Free Speech Principle is accepted, there is a principle according to which
speech is less subject to regulation (within a political theory) than other forms of
conduct having the same or equivalent effects. Under [this] Principle, any governmental action to achieve a goal... must provide a stronger justification when the
attainment of that goal requires the restriction of speech than when no limitations
on speech are employed.... If we think of the general rule as a particular point
on a scale between total state control and unlimited liberty of the individual, a
Free Speech Principle relocates the point on the scale when it is speech that is to
be controlled.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See Scanlon, A Theory, supra note 43, at 204
(free speech doctrine requires philosophical defense insofar as it protects speech acts from
restrictions even though "they have as consequences harms which would normally be sufficient to justify the imposition of legal sanctions"). But see Husak, What Is So Special
About [Free]Speech?, 4 LAw & PHiL. 1, 3 (1985) (denying that speech is "morally special"
and arguing that many exceptions to free speech doctrine are better explained by principle

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:119

argue for a "neutral"5 3 rule: that we all must acquiesce in suffering
the harms that free expression may inflict as the cost of ensuring
the continuing vitality, not of self-government itself, but of individual freedom and self-expression as fundamental principles of
our national democratic experiment. The heroic ideal is annexed to
the individual liberty theory to provide an independent justification for discounting those harms. By denying that the harms inflicted by prejudiced speech differ in a constitutionally meaningful
way from the harms inflicted by hostile criticism of the government (even when prejudiced speech does not fit within that category), the heroic ideal restores the missing theoretical link. Combining the heroic ideal with the principle of individual liberty,
liberals can argue that the first amendment protects prejudiced
speech in the same way, at the same level, and for the same reasons that it protects political dissent.

III.

THE FAILURE OF THE HEROIC IDEAL

The argument for stringent protection of racist speech as an
important attribute of individual liberty does work at some levels
of abstraction. The heroic ideal mirrors an attractive self-image for
us as individuals, as members of groups within society, and as a
society. Who would not prefer to think of herself as self-confident,
brave, daring, and resourceful? Most civil rights activists of
twenty-something years ago passionately believed in every libertarian word quoted above 54 (even those that hadn't been written
yet). We thought that the heroic ideal of the first amendment
that speakers-like others-should escape sanction only when postulated harmful consequences are not morally attributable to their acts).
The argument that universities may regulate prejudiced speech which rises to the level
of discriminatory harassment, see infra notes 180-243 and accompanying text, may be
viewed as a subsidiary rule relocating the point on Professor Schauer's scale, because either
or both an Antidiscrimination Principle and an Affirmative Action Principle, designed to
counteract racism and based on constitutional equality norms, so require.
"' Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
2-10 (1959) (arguing that judicial review of legislative acts is justified only if judiciary generates neutral and general principles that apply regardless of result in particular case). But cf.
Greenawalt, The EnduringSignificance of Neutral Principles,78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 100113 (1978) (even employing neutral principles, judges cannot avoid choosing between conflicting values in deciding constitutional cases); Williams, supra note 11, at 2137 (term "neutral"
in the context of racism "has as its hidden subtext ... to 'concerns of color' "); id. at 2142
("Blacks and women are the objects of a constitutional omission which has been incorporated into a theory of neutrality").
5
See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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would lead and lift us, black and white together, from prejudice to
enlightenment. If everyone-philosophers and demagogues
alike-could think, write, speak, and listen without fear of governmental repression, we could sing, dance, laugh, and persuade our
way to the promised land of equality. But it didn't work out that
way. As we sort through our lives, seeking an answer, we see the
gap between theory and practice, between the heroic ideal and the
humble reality. We are not equally brave and we are not equally
free. Moreover, the freest among us-the ones least likely to suffer
public or private restraint of their expressive (or other)
choices-are often the least brave, and the bravest among us are
often the least free.
The heroic ideal breaks down in practice precisely because we
as individual persons are neither fungible subunits in a mechanical
system of self-government nor fully autonomous beings divorced
from history, culture, and community, from race and sex (both as
biological facts and as social constructs), 55 or from the contingencies of intelligence, talent, and personality. Though we entered the
game in the middle, without knowing the rules, we cannot start'
over. We cannot choose ourselves. We can only seek to influence
the circumstances, to choose our allies, and to discover, create,
combine, and use our resources. But our opportunities and our resources vary. Among the most important variables that constrict
our lives are the ones that seem least justifiable in a democracy
that postulates the equal moral and political worth of every person-the chains of racism, sexism, and other arbitrary and unjust
prejudice.'
The new "outsider jurisprudence," 5 much of it written by racial minorities, women, or minority women, uncovers the hidden,
unequal burdens imposed by the combined force of the heroic ideal
11 See D. RHODE, supra note 13, at 5 (many feminist theorists now "use the term 'sex'
to refer to biological differences between men and women and 'gender' to refer to culturally
constructed differences"); Harris, supra note 9, at 585 (opposing "gender essentialism" that
subordinates differences of race, class, sexual orientation, and experience); Post, supra note
1, at 296-97 (the meaning of race, like the meaning of sex, is socially and politically constructed and therefore unsettled).
'" See Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2323-26 (describing the "outsider jurisprudence" of
"people of color" as "a methodology grounded in the particulars of their social reality and
experience[,] ...consciously both historical and revisionist, attempting to know history
from the bottom[,] ...

realist, [and] ...recognizing, struggling within, and utilizing contra-

diction, dualism, and ambiguity"); Monture, supra note 9, at 160 (recounting her experiences as only Indian woman at legal conference and differentiating her ways of experiencing, knowing, and understanding from those of white law professors).
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and ingrained cultural prejudice. Heterosexual white males, already valued positively for those inherent characteristics and generally (if often subconsciously) identified as both the normal and
the model person, 57 often exalt the heroic ideal of the first amendment while seldom, if ever, suffering its consequences.5 " Members
of disparaged groups who suffer the negative consequences of the
heroic ideal, enduring the real risks and deprivations that flow
from prejudiced speech, discover that supporting the ideal may require us to deny our own perceptions and pains, to divorce what
we know from what we feel, and to cultivate a perpetual wariness
of contact with others who do not share our stigmata and who may
(or so we may come to believe) at any moment turn from apparent
friends or colleagues into hostile strangers, doubly armed with
their own prejudice and with the law's indifference. 9
57 See, e.g., Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1152-59 (1986) ("equality analysis and homogeneity" advance "the male norm"); Wasserstrom, supra note 13, at 586 (our culture
treats nonwhites-especially blacks-as "inferior to the group of standard, fully developed
persons, the adult white males"); cf. Grey, supra note 21, at 25-26 (social and political dominance of whites, males and heterosexuals is illustrated by absence of stigmatizing epithets
comparable to those commonly understood to convey hatred and contempt for racial minorities, women, or gays and lesbians).
" Cf. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 472-76 (tolerance of racist hate speech imposes primary burdens on blacks and other subordinated groups without their consent and replicates
common patterns of injustice in American society).
I realize that the statement in the text is easy to undermine. Although white male
scholars, judges, and lawyers provide much of the support for most versions of the heroic
ideal, e.g., Gunther, supra note 19; Kaufman, supra note 19; Rohde, Crafting Campus
Speech Codes: Any Limitations are Bound to Violate the First Amendment, L.A. Daily J.,
July 19, 1990, § 1, at 6, col. 5, other white males, including some noted first amendment
scholars, have acknowledged and explored some of the failings of liberal theories of the first
amendment, e.g., Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DuxE L.J. 375, 376-85; Biegel, Crafting Campus Speech Codes:
Sensitive Restrictions Can Be Derived From Harassment Law, L.A. Daily J., July 19, 1990,
§ 1, at 6, col. 3; Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets:Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS
L. REv. 287, 303-05 (1990); Grey, supra note 21, at 2-3, 15-17, 25-35; Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf
and the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 161, 166-69 (1990); Smolla, Rethinking
First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
171, 172-78 (1990).
Moreover, some-perhaps many-women and racial minorities are enthusiastic supporters of the heroic ideal. See Strossen, supra note 8, at 486-87 (quoting, among others,
three black men and one black woman; all four are highly successful professionals; two of
the four are nationally prominent-Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director of the NAACP,
and Eleanor Holmes Norton, recently elected as District of Columbia Representative to
Congress).
59 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 17, at 143-49 (blacks must attempt to work with whitedominated legal system to find redress for damaging racial insults); Matsuda, supra note 3,
at 2326 (proposed legal restrictions on hate speech generally are received sympathetically by
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Daring to question the heroic ideal may provoke other negative consequences. The questioners may become further alienated
from a dominant culture that welcomes even reluctant or frightened conformity with its controlling myths, but often chastises
even thoughtful or gentle defiance. The questioned idealists may
respond by condemning the questioners for abandoning civil liberties principles,"0 accusing them of knuckling under to the "easy" or
"politically correct" solution,6 ' or, for academics, swiftly excluding
target groups' members, and skeptically by nonmembers); Monture, supra note 9, at 160-62
(discussing emotional effect of speaking about racism at predominantly white legal conference); Williams, supra note 11, at 2142-43 (laws fail to acknowledge "unfulfilled promises"
of formal equal opportunity). Patricia Monture, a Native American/Canadian, describes a
legal conference at which her passionate empathy with a black woman killed by police officers led her to resist treating the story as a hypothetical for critical legal analysis, only to
discover that her own expressed pain became a subject for similarly distanced observation,
discussion, and dissection by white law professors. See Monture, supra note 9, at 161-70.
'0 See, e.g., Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound," 18 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585, 585 (1983) (characterizing Delgado's article as "fundamentally hostile" to first amendment); Hentoff, The ACLU Does the Right Thing, Village Voice, Nov.
13, 1990, at 20, col. 2 (comparing me, among others, with "Joe McCarthy"); Rohde, supra
note 58 (claiming any campus speech limitation on codes violates first amendment); cf.
Strossen, supra note 8, at 489-93 (criticizing Professor Lawrence's depiction of civil libertarian resistance to "'new perspectives' on the first amendment," while arguing that "strong
common goals" nonetheless unite him with many advocates of traditional civil libertarian
approach). As Professor Grey explains it,
many civil libertarians simply do not see the problem as involving issues of civil
rights or discrimination at all. It is not a clash of equal protection and free speech,
they insist, but a pure civil liberties issue, in which fragile free speech values are
threatened by powerful political pressure groups on liberal campuses.
Grey, supra note 21, at 16 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 53 n.26 ("few causes attract
more powerful emotional adherence than does first amendment absolutism") (emphasis in
original).
61 See articles cited supra note 20; cf. Strossen, supra note 8, at 554 ("[h]ate speech
regulations... may appear to provide a relatively inexpensive 'quick fix,' but racist speech
is only one symptom of the pervasive problem of racism, and this underlying problem will
not be solved by banning one of its symptoms"). But no proponent (that I know of) believes
that regulating prejudiced speech on campus is cheap, easy, or likely to eradicate racism.
The goals, rather, are to combat prejudice, to prevent discriminatory harassment, and to
protect the rights of minority students to equal access to higher education. See, e.g., ADL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19-20 (quoting Professor Thomas Grey); Grey, supra
note 21, at 42 (punishing violators of Stanford harassment regulation "provides a remedy for
an action that causes real pain and harm to real individuals while doing no good; and it may
serve to deter such actions in the future"); Hodulik, ProhibitingDiscriminatory Harassment by Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing of First Amendment and University
Interests, 16 J. COLLEGE & UNiv. L. 573, 575 (1990) (discussing rules adopted at University
of Wisconsin); STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 1 (policy intended to guide students in area where free expression can conflict with right to be free of "invidious
discrimination").
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them from the pantheon of serious scholars. 2 Some defenders of
the heroic ideal abandon both compassion and common sense in
urging the victims of prejudiced speech to approve rigidly formalistic notions of freedom and, as a corollary, to disregard the realistic
danger that unchecked racism or sexism may escalate from offhand
comments, unconsidered stereotyping, and generalized denunciation to particularized psychological assault, overt discriminatory
action, or physical violence. 3
The central critique of the heroic ideal, then, is that in the
guise of liberty, neutrality, and openness, it reinforces existing social and political relationships of dominance and subordination
and thus legitimates prejudice and inequality. From another perspective, it is a paradigm whose time has come and gone. Most of
the free speech controversies which shaped our first amendment
jurisprudence from World War I through the 1960's involved disempowered activists who spoke from the margins of society, appealing to the center to expand its notion of acceptable discourse.6 4
62 See, e.g., Delgado, Professor Delgado Replies, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 593 pas-

sim (1983) (responding to Heins' criticism of prior article); Lawrence, supra note 10, at 47576 (agreeing with Delgado's argument that "low grade racism" excludes many nonwhites
who have "real spirit, real pride" from pursuing academic careers); cf. Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 56162 (1984) (white male authors who support minority rights cite almost exclusively each
other rather than minority authors and generally fail to acknowledge minority scholarship
on civil rights). Given the recent upsurge in attention to minority scholarship, this line of
criticism may seem outdated. Many of the new minority, women, and minority women
scholars now publish regularly in major law reviews. Nonetheless, several distinguished participants in the Wisconsin Conference on Critical Race Theory, November 9-10, 1990, at the

University of Wisconsin-Madison, described incidents and expressed feelings of exclusion,
especially related to their critiques of first amendment doctrine.
03 See Minow, Neutrality, Equality & Tolerance: New Norms for a Decade of Distinction, 22 CHANGE 17, 19-20. (Jan./Feb. 1990) (traditional first amendment approach ignores
genuine injury inflicted on victims of racist expression). "Equality will remain elusive until
everyone pays attention to the perspectives of others." Id. Professor Minow quotes a black
woman's question, replying to white friends' reassurance that local Ku Klux Klan activities
were not a serious threat: "How can I feel safe when my friends don't respect my sense of
danger?" Id. at 25; see also Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2335 (describing racially motivated
killings that demonstrate "connection between racist words and racist deeds"); Williams,
supra note 12, at 140 ("[v]ery little in our language or our culture encourages or reinforces
any attempt to look at others as part of ourselves").
Cf. Balkin, supra note 58, at 383-84 (although first amendment has helped unpopular, generally leftist groups gain political power in past, conservative interests have learned
to use it to protect property rights and existing social arrangements); Kairys, Freedom of
Speech, in THE PoLrrIcs OF LAW: A PROoRSSIVE CRITIQUE 140 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (leftwing political movements and organized labor were instrumental in shaping modern first
amendment law).
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Defenders of the heroic ideal analogize today's Nazis, Ku Klux
Klan members, pornographers, and even anti-abortionists to the
anti-war protesters and civil rights demonstrators of the sixties-all without apparent irony.65 Yet the differences are at least
as striking as the similarities. Racist, sexist, or-perhaps most
clearly-homophobic expression is not, or not often, the despised
speech of marginal dissenters, representing a viewpoint that the
majority seeks to suppress. It is far more likely to represent an
overt expression of covert, or thinly veiled, majoritarian views. 8
Despite the extreme difficulty of separating majoritarian hate
speech from unpopular hate speech (the speech of abortion opponents seems especially problematic), doctrine created to permit
hostile criticism of the government or to enable progressive social
movements to participate in public dialogue may not apply unchanged either to repressive speakers who seek to destroy that dialogue or to majoritarian speakers who crowd-or push-dissenters
off the platform. Moreover, it can be extraordinarily liberating
even to ask the question why the rules should or should not be the
same for all speakers, even if in the end you concede, as I will, that
most-though not all-of them should. 7 The question reminds us
that doctrine should not be venerated in itself; the first amendment matters to us because of the values that it serves.
The libertarian answer to the question has taken several
forms. One approach is to examine the purposes that have been
attributed to the first amendment.6 8 Free expression has been described as crucial to democracy because it encourages political dissent and debate, moral inquiry, and participation in self-government;"" limits or checks governmental power by exposing abuses;70
6"

I've done it myself. See, e.g., Gale & Strossen, supra note 6, at 177-80 (comparing

Nazis, Klan members, and pornographers to civil rights activists and feminists).

"

See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 447 ("for over three hundred years, racist speech has

been the liturgy of America's leading established religion, the religion of racism"); Fulwood,
supra note 3 (poll shows most white Americans still hold prejudiced attitudes toward racial
minorities, especially blacks); cf. Davis, supra note 9, at 1565-68 (describing how racism
affects lives of people of color on daily basis).
6" See infra text accompanying notes 196, 221-22.
60 But see Post, supra note 1, at 278 (first amendment doctrine is "a vast Sargasso Sea
of drifting and entangled values, theories, rules, exceptions, predilections" that does not
yield useful principles when reduced to "formulaic invocations of first amendment 'interests'" such as self-fulfillment, truth-finding, and democratic governance).
69 E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEm OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 6-7 (1970) (individuals
must "test [their] judgment[s] by exposing [them] to opposition"; government by consent
requires individuals to "have full freedom of expression both in forming individual judg-
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promotes mutual tolerance, diversity, self-doubt, and self-restraint;71 manages social change and conflict by ensuring that dissident opinions will be examined and considered rather than suppressed and denied;7 2 provides information, advances knowledge,
stimulates intellectual exploration, and discovers truth;73 nurtures
the arts to enrich our lives; 74 and promotes individual autonomy
ments and in forming the common judgment"); A. MEIKLFJOHN, supra note 33, at 27 (free
speech essential to democracy); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 196 (same).
70 Eg., Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 537 (first amendment encourages intensive scrutiny of public officials); Dorsen,
The Need for a New Enlightenment:Lessons in Liberty from the Eighteenth Century, 38
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 479, 488 (1988) (one purpose of free speech is to deter and expose
government corruption).
71 See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SocImT 9-11 (1986); Bollinger, supra note 17, at
983-96.
72 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 69, at 7 (open discussion promotes social cohesion
"because people are most ready to accept decisions that go against them if they have a part
in the decision-making process"); id. at 182 ("[a]llowing racists and misogynists to speak
may help us as a society ... to see and begin to repair the harms we have done"); Gale &
Strossen, supra note 6, at 171 ("racism, sexism, and silence have combined too often to form
an unholy trinity in the history of oppression in the United States").
"' See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (ultimate desired good is "better reached by free trade in ideas"); T. EMERSON, supra
note 69, at 6; J. MILL, ON LmERTY 16-52 (A. Castell ed. 1947) (1859), summarized in G.
STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 931-32 (1986); J.
MILTON, Areopagitica, A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the Parliamentof England, in MILTON'S PROSE 275, 318-19 (M. Wallace ed. 1959)
(1644) (freedom of press promotes exposure of falsehood and search for truth); F. SCHAUER,
supra note 52, at 15-34 (criticizing argument's reliance on the prevalence of reason in the
face of "numerous counter-examples" from history but endorsing it as "useful" in encouraging skepticism about individual and governmental judgments); Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications,89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130-41 (1989) (analyzing "truth-discovery" argument
in detail and concluding that "the connection between understanding and communication is
powerful enough" to support "a distinctive principle of freedom of speech").
"I See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("our cases have
never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or
ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protection"); Chafee, Book Review, 62 H~av. L. REv. 891, 900 (1949) (reviewing A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 33) (it would
be "shocking" to deprive vital matters of art and literature of first amendment protection);
Mattick, Arts and the State, 251 THE NATION 348, 353-57 (Oct. 1, 1990) (reporting on controversy over government censorship of government-funded art); Shapiro, Prudery and
Power: From Comstockery to Helmsmanship, 251 THE NATION 335, 338 (Oct. 1, 1990) (linking congressional attempts to police grants by National Endowment for Arts with "a wideranging attack on sexual privacy, reproductive rights and free speech"); cf. Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255-57, 263 (including arts and
literature within self-government theory). But see F. SCHAUER, supra note 52, at 110-11 (although artistic censorship is usually intended to prevent art's influence on viewers or listeners and thus within constraints of free speech principles, insofar as art is not communication
it "may not be" protected by such principles). One wonders what Schauer would make of
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and self-fulfillment."5 Beneath all these purposes lies a central assumption that elevates process over content. Democracy by its very

nature is and must be pluralistic, various, and incomplete. Most if
not all fundamental moral and political questions have only multiple, diverse, and contingent, not single, fixed, or final, answers.
Even our understanding of what it means to be an autonomous
individual-of what rights that hope may imply,76 or what rela-

tionships with others it may require 7 7 -is itself contextual, culturally constructed, and subject to change. As an ineluctable corollary,
then, though government may sometimes regulate the means of

communication,7 8 it can never (or hardly ever) restrict the message.
Government's only role is to facilitate public discourse, to provide
"the framework for all possible forms of politics"179 in the broadest
sense-the interplay of asserted ideas, facts, feelings, and opinions.
Government regulations therefore must be neutral with respect to
both the content of the speech and the viewpoint of the speaker.80
Archibald MacLeish's famous lines, "A poem should be palpable and mute/ As a globed
fruit .... A poem should not mean/ But be." Ars Poetica, in THE MENTOR BOOK OF MAJOR
AMERICAN PoETs 434 (0. Williams & E. Honig eds. 1962). Or is the disclaimer of communication itself communication?
71 See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 964, 995-96 (1978) (voluntary speech involves self-realization or self-fulfillment of
speaker); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 598 (1982) (free speech
leads to individualism); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) (value of free expression rests on
its relation to self-respect); Scanlon, A Theory, supra note 43, at 215-19.
7' For one example, the "right" to an abortion is meaningless unless it can be safely
accomplished by available medical techniques. Yet, it can be argued, the medical technology
would not have been developed if we had not first recognized the interest and conceptualized the right.
77 See I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EssAYs ON LMERTY 118, 155 (paperback ed. 1969) (each of us is inevitably social not just because we must interact with and
may harm each other but also because our ideas of ourselves and our "sense of [our] own
moral and social identity[] are intelligible only in terms of the social network" to which we
belong); cf. C.

GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT

VOICE 63 (1982). "[W]e know ourselves as separate

only insofar as we live in connection with others, and ... we experience relationship only
insofar as we differentiate other from self." Id.
78 E.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984)
(National Park Service may apply anti-camping regulations to political protesters sleeping
in park across from White House); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) (city may apply rule against posting signs on public property to
political candidate seeking to advertise his candidacy on utility poles); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949) (city may prohibit use of loudspeakers in residential areas).
Post, supra note 1, at 314.
" E.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315, 334 (1988) (invalidating District of Columbia's
prohibition of displaying any sign within 500 feet of foreign embassy if sign "tends to bring
that foreign government into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute' "); Police Dep't of Chicago
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"[A]bove all else," the Supreme Court has declared, "the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content."81
Abstracted from the facts that prompted it and treated it as
an empirical description of the law, this assertion is nonsense. The
first amendment, as construed (and constructed) by the Court,
permits the government to ban or restrict a wide variety of expression because of its content or its viewpoint-not just crimes or
torts accomplished wholly or partially by words, such as fraud,
bribery, perjury, agreements to fix prices or to rob a bank, and offers to pay for criminal acts,82 but also defamation, 3 obscenity,"4
some commercial advertising,85 and false statements of fact (as opv. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972) (invalidating, under equal protection analysis, city's
prohibition of all picketing near school except for labor union picketers).
S" Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
82See Balkin, supra note 58, at 522; Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. BAR.
FOUND. RES. J. 645, 741-43.
8'See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (government
officials generally may recover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to official conduct if they prove defamation made with "'actual malice' . . . with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"). Sullivan is usually stated
the other way around (government officials may not recover damages unless ... ) as a major
victory for proponents of free expression, which of course it was. Nonetheless, even the
words of its best-known passage imply the possibility of content-based limitations outside
the not-clearly-defined arena of public discourse or when the person attacked is not a public
official. There is, as Justice Brennan wrote, "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
'8 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31-32 (1973) (state may ban communications found obscene under detailed three-part test). In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982), the Court upheld a state's ban on producing or distributing even non-obscene pornography that depicts sexual performances by children under age 16. Id. at 753-58. The
statute survived strict scrutiny because preventing sexual abuse of children is a compelling
government interest of "surpassing importance" and no less restrictive means were available
to protect it. Id. at 757. In Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990), the Court upheld a
state's ban on private possession of non-obscene child pornography because the purpose was
to protect children, not to "regulat[e] Osborne's mind." Id. at 1696.
66 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (state may ban commercial speech if regulation satisfies detailed fourpart test); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
388-89 (1973) (government may forbid sex-designated job advertising where sex-based decisions would violate laws against employment discrimination). But see Linmark Assocs., Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (government may not ban truthful
"For Sale" and "Sold" signs as means of slowing white homeowners' departure from racially
integrated neighborhood); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (state may not ban truthful advertising of prescription drug prices;
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posed to opinion).8" The list could continue, 7 but why bother? Although libertarians ordinarily resist the exclusion of some of these
categories, such as obscenity,8 from the circle of protected speech,
no one seriously argues that the first amendment means that anyone anywhere can say absolutely anything. 9 Once that concession
is made and the exceptions multiply, then the question about racist speech becomes more pointed: if we can draw lines between
unprotected fraud or misrepresentation and protected truthful advertising, if we can differentiate sales talk from political or cultural
speech, if we can determine when school officials are censoring
books or newspapers to suppress ideas and when they are doing so
to fulfill educational standards,90 then why can we not mark off
boundaries between prohibited racist and sexist harassment and
permissible, though racist or sexist, self-expression or intellectual
inquiry? It seems impossible to argue that commercial fraud (or
ban "hits the hardest... the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged" who cannot easily
engage in comparison shopping).
" See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) (New York Times ruling does not apply to defamatory falsehoods involving "matters
of purely private concern"). But cf. L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 878 (2d ed.
1988) (laws that narrowly permit compensating private individuals for reputational harms
regulate speech for reasons "other than content, at least in the sense that the objective is
unrelated to whether government approves or disapproves the content of the message").
87 For instance, the Court allows some regulation of high school student newspapers
based directly on their content. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 272-73 (1988) (high school officials may censor student newspaper articles that do not
meet journalistic standards); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) (public school officials may remove library books if motivated by
educational unsuitability or pervasive vulgarity but not if motivated by dislike for ideas
expressed). These decisions permit government regulations based on content,
but-arguably-not on viewpoint. Nonetheless, a sophisticated defendant should have little
trouble demonstrating the appropriate motive to insulate its regulations.
88 See, e.g., POLICY GUME OF THE AMERICAN CIviL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICY No. 4, at 6-9
(rev. ed. 1990) (obscenity should also be included in protected speech category). I agree that
unless obscenity or pornography constitutes discriminatory harassment as defined below,
see infra text accompanying notes 241-43, it should count as protected speech-despite
powerful arguments to the contrary by Andrea Dworkin and Professor MacKinnon. See A.
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN passim (1981); C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM

supra note 13, at 10-15, 209-13, 221-28; MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 passim (1985).
88 See, e.g., Cohen, Free Speech and Political Extremism: How Nasty Are We Free to
Be?, 7 LAW & PHIL. 263, 266 (1988/89) ("neither the Constitution, nor any sensible principle
lying behind it, guarantees the right to say anything, anywhere, anytime"). This Article succinctly reiterates the standard arguments against regulation of political expression and exemplifies support for the heroic ideal of the first amendment. Interestingly, Cohen describes
his own views not as liberal but as "conservative," id. at 264, and "libertarian," id. at 275.
80 See supra note 87. As there suggested, I doubt that we can.
UNMODIFIED,
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exuberantly careless high school journalism) is more harmful to the
nation-or more destructive of individual lives-than the devastations of racial prejudice.
Even the argument that unprotected racist speech is more difficult to identify than unprotected commercial speech,9 1 despite its
initial persuasiveness, seems ultimately to rest on the unproved assertion that racist speech contributes to self-expression or self-government hi ways that commercial speech does not. Yet the Constitution-the blueprint for our system of self-governmentexplicitly favors congressional regulation of commerce 2 for the
purpose of ensuring that it fulfills national goals.9 3 Although Congress can ban or limit commerce-for instance, to outlaw private
racial discrimination by hotels, restaurants, and other public accommodations' 4-- the Constitution's basic message is that commerce (and by ready extension, commercial speech that promotes
it) is a good thing, though open to abuse and subject to legislative
control. By contrast, though belatedly and by amendment, the
Constitution explicitly bans official racism." It brands racism a
bad thing, harmful to self-government, and invites legislative regulation of not only public but private racism. 6 The Constitution
91 See Strossen, supra note 8, at 537-39.

9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9 See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 110 S. Ct. 914, 917 (1990) (developing recreational trails
and preserving unused railroad lines); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 301-02 (1981) (protecting "prime farmland" from strip mining).
" Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
"' See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. The Supreme Court also has implied an
equal protection component into the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (equal protection analysis in fifth amendment area same as
under fourteenth amendment); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (District of
Columbia's racially segregated schools violate fifth amendment guarantee of due process).
96 See U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, § 2; XIV, § 5. Because the fourteenth amendment
focuses on state-sponsored discrimination, however, section 5 may not authorize regulation
of private activities. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6-7 (1883) (Reconstruction civil
rights laws regulating private conduct are not authorized by fourteenth amendment). That
is one reason why Congress justified its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the
commerce clause. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261 (Congress adopted Act
to eliminate barriers in interstate commerce caused by discrimination). But see United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966) (six Justices endorse congressional power to
punish private conspiracies that interfere with exercise of fourteenth amendment rights).
See generally L. TRie, supra note 86, at 350-53 (suggesting that fourteenth amendment,
§ 5 power is unnecessary to reach private racial discrimination because Congress may control private conduct under commerce clause and thirteenth amendment, and may forbid
private interference with privileges or immunities of national citizenship derived from constitutional structure and recognized by § 1 of fourteenth amendment); Lawrence, supra note
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therefore suggests that racist speech is at least as recognizable an
evil and as appropriate a subject for regulation as commercially
fraudulent speech.9 7 Of course, we do not customarily think of racist speech that way because we categorize it as "political speech."
But commerce and politics are just as entangled as racism and
politics, and the category of "political speech" seems just as malleable and socially constructed as "obscenity" or "commercial
speech." If the boundaries of protected speech no longer serve
democratic ideals,9 8 there is no reason other than blind allegiance
to legal formalism not to change them.
One possible reply is to contend, with Professor Harry Kalven,
that "[f]reedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for all,
we will have it for none." 9 This remark can have more than one
meaning.1 00 But insofar as it is cited for the purpose of arguing
that free speech is a unitary system, it is open to Professor MacKinnon's riposte that equality too is a unitary system. 10 1 If any victory for expression advances democracy, any victory for prejudice
and inequality hinders it. Only if liberty clearly trumps equality as
the primary value of democracy as a form of government or of our
particular democracy, 10 2 does it seem possible to end the discussion
by asserting the "indivisibility" of free speech.
Moreover, that assertion seems to rely on willful ignorance of
10, at 444-49 (rejecting "state action" requirement because private racist speech also infringes blacks' claims to liberty and equal protection).
91 Cf. Strossen, supra note 8, at 536 & n.256 ("[r]acist speech is arguably different in
kind from other offensive speech, because the elimination of racism is itself enshrined in our
Constitution as a public value of the highest order"(quoting Professor Rodney Smolla))
(emphasis in original).
98 See Balkin, supra note 58, at 387, 393-94; cf. Bollinger, supra note 17, at 988-89
(considering, but rejecting, possibilities that "free speech promotes an excessive and undesirable individualism or quest for truth at the expense of other undernourished values" and
"toleration of bad speech might be rooted in a wish to have the speakers injure the victims
. . .or in sheer insensitivity and unconcern").
99Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L.
REv. 428, 432 (1967).
100 See infra text accompanying notes 101-29.
101 See Balkin, supra note 58, at 377; MacKinnon, supra note 88, at 4.
102 See, e.g, Strossen, supra note 8, at 568-69 & n.432 and authorities cited therein
(raising the question without answering it). Strossen appears to argue instead both that
empirically, and perhaps theoretically, liberty and equality are always interdependent and
never in conflict, see id. at 493-94, 555-61, 569 (minorities will be first targets of any regulation suppressing racist speech; any such regulation will encourage rather than reduce racism), and that it is strategically better not to acknowledge any conflict, see id. at 491. But
see Grey, supra note 21, at 1-2 (problem of discriminatory verbal harassment illuminates
conflict between civil liberties and civil rights perspectives).
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the actual distribution of free speech as a resource in the United
States today. "Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those
who own one," A. J. Liebling once wrote. 03 Freedom of expression
fares better, especially if the speaker enlists her imaginative resources to gain access to expressive resources owned by others,0 4
but not that much better. Free speech is scarcely an issue for
prominent apostles of the cultural or political status quo. They
nearly always have more of it than they need, while dissidents-especially inarticulate or marginal ones-must struggle for
meaningful access to a marketplace of ideas that operates (if at all)
on the principles of social Darwinism rather than distributive justice. In fact, racism and sexism have operated as an interlocking
system of prejudice, coercion, and subordination just as certainly
as has censorship. 0 5 As the new outsider jurisprudence compellingly demonstrates, racism and sexism have even functioned-however imperfectly-as an informal system of censorship; they have sometimes served to deny proponents of
egalitarianism (of black or female participation/supremacy) not
only the chance to speak but also the chance to be listened to, and
thus to participate effectively in the dialogue of democracy. 06
103 A. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 30 (rev. paperback ed. 1964). Liebling was The New
Yorker's press critic for many years. See Gale, Furthermore:An Obscene Case?, [MORE]
THE JOURNALISM REV., Feb. 1976, at 23.
Casting one's news nets wide but (mostly) shallow is not a moral virtue that suffices in all situations. And, on the whole, the daily press and the weekly newsmagazines are merely bland, not broad. Their pages lop off the edges of experience,
grind emotions into cliches, homogenize ideas in the editorial blender, and too
often portray a tidy government of plans and progressions that is wildly divergent
from the surprises and confusions of real life. Is that what the First Amendment is
for?
Id. at 24.
104 That, of course, is what Gregory Johnson did by burning the flag during the 1984
Republican National Convention in Dallas. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2546
(1989).
105 See, e.g., D. BELL, supra note 5; K. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 43-80 (1989); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1358 (blacks are
"boxed in" by consensus among many whites that the oppression of Blacks is legitimate");
Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality,30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (fourteenth
amendment's main target is stigma of racial caste and system of group subordination).
1* I realize that this claim is highly controversial. Black advocates like Malcolm X and
Stokely Carmichael in the 1960's and Louis Farrakhan in the 1980's captured substantial
attention in the media and delivered their messages to large audiences. Martin Luther King,
Jr., preaching egalitarianism, was among the best-known orators and leaders of his era. Radical feminists like Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon are not overtly suppressed
today; their works are widely published. Yet both groups have struggled with hostility from
mainstream scholars and media.

1991]

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Another' libertarian answer has been to shift focus. Instead of
berating the questioners for insisting on our power and responsibility to draw lines between protected and unprotected expression on
the basis of values that correspond with our experiences in the real
world, liberals may argue that the questioners are endorsing a set
of dangerous (because unclear and unbounded) distinctions when
they should instead approve a different set of safer (because clear
and limited) distinctions: between speech and action, 10 7 between
government expression and private expression, 10 8 or, perhaps, between the public discourse that is necessary to self-government
and all other discourse that (by hypothesis) is not. 09 These distinctions, it is argued, permit the sovereign (but nongovernmental)
collective will of the people to prevail because the untrustworthy
agents of government'" cannot readily alter them. Unlike distinctions between, for example, discriminatory verbal harassment and
statements of racist opinion, such line-drawing is neutral, objective, and comfortably removed from the problem of government
By calling racism (and sexism) systems of censorship I do not mean that they are never
questioned, even by powerful and original voices. I mean rather that they influence us-all
of us-to discount the value of words spoken by women and minorities, especially when
women and minorities choose to speak on matters of public policy that we are accustomed
to leaving to white male decision-makers. This discounting in turn affects both the consciousness from which our expression springs and the expression that we give to that
consciousness.
107 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 8, at 492, 494, 532-33, 541-44 (distinguishing speech
from action is central to traditional libertarian view of free expression).
108 See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 284 & n.73 (discussing relationship between freedom
of expression and democratic self-government); Strossen, supra note 8, at 492, 544-47 (distinction between governmental and private speech and action is crucial because of "government's constitutional duty to disassociate itself from racism").
109 As Professor Post explains it,
[D]emocracy, like all forms of government, must ultimately be capable of accomplishing the tasks of governance.... Democratic governments must therefore have
the power to regulate behavior. But because public discourse is understood as the
communicative medium through which the democratic "self" is itself constituted,
public discourse must in important respects remain exempt from democratic regulation. We use the speech/action distinction to mark the boundaries of this exemption. Because all "[w]ords are deeds," this distinction is purely pragmatic. We
designate the communicative processes necessary to sustain the principle of collective self-determination "speech" and thus insulate it from majoritarian
interference.
Post, supra note 1, at 285 (footnotes omitted). The problem, of course, is to distinguish
between expression that is "necessary" to enable us to govern ourselves and expression that
is not.
110 See supra note 52 (quoting Schauer).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:119

censorship of hostile criticism or of other disfavored ideas.'
In fact, however, the distinction between speech and conduct
is at least as fuzzy as the line between different kinds of speech.
Professor Post boldly acknowledges that "[w]e designate the communicative processes necessary to sustain the principle of collective self-determination 'speech'" to protect them from regulation," 2 a formulation that, in less sophisticated language, would
bear a striking resemblance to Justice Stewart's famous test for
obscenity, "I know it when I see it.""" Flag-burning to criticize the
government is, in Professor Ely's somewhat less famous phrase,
"100% action and 100% expression.""' 4 In some cases, therefore,
there is no line at all. Perhaps the best way out of this dilemma is
the one Ely suggests-asking whether the harm the state seeks to
deflect stems from the expressive act's "communicative significance" or not." 5 But for some crucial cases relevant to racist expression, even the answer to that question is far from certain. In
Brown v. Board of Education"6 the Court declared "a principle of
equal citizenship" that forbids "the systematic group defamation
of segregation" imposed for the purpose of maintaining "the mes"1 Cf. Strossen, supra note 8, at 532 (referring to "the critical distinction between
speech that has a direct and immediate link to unlawful conduct and all other speech, which
has less direct and immediate links"). But see id. at 542-43 (twice conceding lack of clear
distinction between speech and conduct).
n" Post, supra note 1, at 285; see also supra note 109 (quoting Post).
11 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (majority did

not see "it" in film reviewed; dissent did).
14 See Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975) (twice stating
"burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100%
action and 100% expression"); see also id. at 1495 n.53 (acknowledging "[t]he impulse to
define clear categories, and thus better to safeguard freedom of expression in times of national panic" but rejecting speech-conduct distinction as unworkable).
"5 Id. at 1497. Ely also effectively demolishes most of the cherished distinction between
forbidden regulation of message or content and permissible regulation of "time, place, and
manner," observing that governments often regulate the latter to suppress the former, as in
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school may not
forbid students to wear armbands as nondisruptive anti-war protest). See Ely, supra note
114, at 1498. Professor Balkin carries the argument one step further, observing that the
Supreme Court's
public forum cases ... have produced exactly what one would expect from a guarantee of formal equality in conditions of substantive economic inequality .... [A]
low level of scrutiny in cases involving time, place, and manner regulation will
produce not only less speech overall, but less speech from the least powerful
groups in society.
Balkin, supra note 58, at 397.
11 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sage of white supremacy. ' 117 Does the harm the state seeks to correct in prohibiting separate but equal schools stem primarily from
the stigma the system of segregation communicates or not? 18
What if stigma from the communicative aspects of segregation and
educational deprivation from its noncommunicative aspects intertwine (as they surely do)? 1 9 But I need not untangle this knot to
reject treating the distinction between speech and action as a superior method for separating protected from unprotected speech.
The distinction between public and private speech is perhaps
sharper than that between speech and action. 20 If agents of the
government are speaking or acting for the government, that is public expression; if individuals are speaking or acting for themselves
(or for nongovernmental associations), that is private expression.
Moreover, both the first and the fourteenth amendments seem, at
least facially, to limit protection for the rights they create to impairment by persons directly wielding the authority of the state.
Implicitly, then, it can be argued, they authorize private individu11 Lawrence, supra note 10, at 438-44; see Bollinger, supra note 17, at 980-81 (injuries

that stem from segregating schools, forcing blacks to sit at back of bus, or denying them
hotel rooms and restaurant service are "largely the thought and message of inferiority, of
hatred and contempt, that is communicated by the discriminatory act and that afflicts the
human spirit of the victim... Racist speech does not differ in kind, nor does it necessarily
differ in magnitude of injury") (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, Bollinger views racist
speech as protected because "free speech may simply function as a zone of extreme toleration" where we learn to accept "divergent behavior." Id. at 984.
118 Professor Lawrence contends that it does. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 440-43. Professor Strossen contends that it does not. Strossen, supra note 8, at 542-43.
1'
Professor Lawrence argues that "[tihe non-speech elements are byproducts of the
main message [of white supremacy]." Lawrence, supra note 10, at 441. Professor Strossen
argues that state-mandated school segregation treated blacks as inferior "through pervasive
patterns of conduct" and that the "message [of inferiority] was only incidental." Strossen,
supra note 8, at 542. As an editor of an alternative newspaper that covered the civil rights
movement in Alabama and Mississippi from 1965 to 1968, I never met anyone who thought
the message was "incidental." Arguably, though, Brown was intended and understood, at
the time and throughout the 1960's, as a decision outlawing particular official actions that
were part of a combined system of action and expression that subjugated blacks to whites.
But if constitutional law-or at least the equal protection clause-evolves, that need not be
its meaning today. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
Presumably we are not tied to our past epistemological mistakes.
120 Or perhaps not. This area is too complex for summary explication. See generally L.
TRInE, supra note 86, at 1688-1720 (general discussion of public/private speech distinction);
Freeman & Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFFALO
L. REv. 237 (1987) (legal liberalism constructs artificial categories of "public" and "private"
that diminish both public responsibility and private experience). For an early but valuable
analysis, see Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: 'State Action,' Equal Protection, and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 100-09 (1967).
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als to inflict the same kind of harm without restriction.121 But at
least two important situations are indeterminate: when a government official speaks or purports to speak as a private citizen and
when government itself or government officials instigate, encourage, cooperate with, ratify, or acquiesce in private speech that
damages constitutional rights.
The second situation is the relevant one for this analysis. The
Supreme Court has recognized that government agents cannot
delegate unconstitutional acts to private persons and then shield
them from constitutional scrutiny as private rather than public action.1 22 Nor, at least in some circumstances, can they "tacit[ly] ratif[y]" a private choice that would be unconstitutional if made by
the state. 2 3 The real question here examines whether distinguishing government prejudiced speech from private prejudiced speech
is a philosophically satisfying or empirically successful way to protect individual liberty from coercion that interferes with self-determination, 2 4 or, more likely, whether the distinction instead serves
to shield unconstitutional manifestations of racism (speech acts
that are legitimated by the absence of legal controls) that, while
furthering the actor's self-determination, impermissibly destroy
12 5
the self-determination of others.
The libertarian argument privileges untrammeled private racist speech and divorces it from similar state or state-sanctioned
speech that would violate constitutional rights. 2 6 The argument
121 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 8, at 544-47 (first amendment protects private speech
endorsing racism just as it protects private speech endorsing religion).
122 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982) (private

person who attaches disputed property before adjudication pursuant to state statute and
with assistance of state officials is "state actor" suable under federal civil rights statutes);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (private company which operates entire town
cannot exclude religious proselytizers from streets). But see Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 161-63 (1978) (state statute permitting warehouse owners to sell warehoused
items to obtain unpaid storage fees does not convert owners into state actors subject to
fourteenth amendment due process requirements); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
569-70 (1972) (private shopping center may exclude anti-war protesters from mall).
123 See L. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 1689.
12 See Post, supra note 1, at 284 ("some form of public/private distinction is necessarily implied by democracy understood as a project of self-determination"). But see id. at 284
n.87 (distinction is nonetheless "inherently unstable and problematic, for all government
regulation influences ... the formation of individual identity").
125 See Balkin, supra note 58, at 416-20 (arguing that because system of legal rights and
obligations constructs individual will and free choice, it is impossible, without circularity, to
justify freedom of private racist speech as self-determination).
128 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 8, at 544.
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seems to depend on a social contractarian model of imaginary
human beings who formulate their own consciousness and select
their political values in a prehistoric, precultural, prelegal state of
grace that produces a substantial distrust of the idea of government.127 Not knowing what their own situation will be, they choose
the greatest possible freedom commensurate with social order.
Once we reject this model in favor of one that accepts the reality of
contextual, specific lives, burdened in different ways by the hierarchies of politics, law, and culture, and inescapably tied to history,
it seems much less obvious that private speech is necessarily less
harmful than or easily separable from government speech. Even if
we can identify and circumscribe purely private speech, our knowledge of the intractable reality of prejudice reduces the likelihood
that we should choose to exempt private expression from constitutional norms of equal rights. The proper question instead concerns
whether unrestricted private speech causes the harms that equality
rights were established to avert. If so, only the existence of some
countervailing constitutional norm that supersedes the equality
rights of the victims should protect private racist speech from government regulation.
This, it seems to me, is the point at which libertarian absolutists, whether or not they explicitly acknowledge it, simply choose
the liberty rights of the speakers over the liberty and equality
rights of those who may suffer harm from the unrestricted speech.
In the context of our particular constitutional history and the society we have constructed, that also means choosing racial and sexual discrimination, or at least that which is accomplished by
speech acts that are not defined as regulable conduct.' 28 Even Professor Post's subtler argument that free speech doctrine provides a
neutral matrix, "the framework for all possible forms of politics,"1 29 is subject to the criticism that it reifies the neutrality it
idealizes without regard to the contextual reality of bias. There is
no neutral framework. There is only this imperfect world.
127 Cf. J. RAWLS,

A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971) (imagining "original position" in which

rational but abstract persons who know nothing of their actual individual attributes-such
as race, sex, status, wealth, or political views-construct society and choose principles of
justice through "fair agreement or bargain").
128 Cf. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 446 ("alternative 'to regulating racist speech is infringement of the claims of blacks to liberty and equal protection").
129 Post, supra note 1, at 285; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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AN EQUALITY-BASED THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The idea of equality is built into the structure of the first
amendment. Free speech is guaranteed not just to one speaker or
to one class of speakers but by simple inference to all speakers. In
refusing dominance to the most obvious choice for hierarchical
control (i.e., the government elected by the prescribed majority),
the first amendment implicitly rejects all other hierarchies as well,
including hierarchies of free speech that stem from existing concentrations of social power understood to be "private" despite
their individual and cumulative effects on our public life. In granting equal liberty, the first amendment may implicitly require dismantling even private structures of prejudice as vital to the fulfillment of its free speech guarantee.
By contrast, most libertarian theories of the first amendment
insist on a negative model of free speech-defining it as freedom
from restrictions imposed by the constraints of government and
law. 180 This freedom is justified by the notion that some area of
unregulated personal choice is the most centrally humanizing characteristic of all.13 ' Even though "individual freedom is not everyone's primary need" (because food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and even education may be first in our priorities if we have been
deprived of them),12 its possibility provides, for many libertarian
theorists, a foundation for democratic self-government. Yet, as
Isaiah Berlin points out, no logical or necessary connection exists
between negative liberty and democracy. A democracy may deprive
individual citizens of many liberties that a despotic regime may
grant.' The collective choices we democratically make may restrain a wide variety of activities that we as individuals might otherwise undertake, from printing our own money to speaking our
own minds. In order to connect democratic self-government with
negative liberty, libertarians first must generate the idea of political rights-entitlements that even a majoritarian government cannot limit or invade to increase the common good' 34-and then in"' See, e.g., I. BERLIN, supra note 77, at 122-31 (defining "'negative' freedom" and
differentiating coercion "by [other] human beings" from innate "incapacity to attain a
goal"). Berlin explicitly recognizes that this distinction "depends on a particular social and
economic theory about the causes" of deprivation or inequality. Id. at 123.
"' See id. at 124, 126-28.
132 Id. at 124.
3 Id. at 129-30.
" See, e.g., TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 269.
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clude negative liberty within that set of protected rights. To most
Americans accustomed to negative conceptions of free speech, this
sequence may seem not only natural, but philosophically-perhaps
even morally-compelled. But it is not the only way to connect
liberty with self-government. At least two formidable objections
preclude accepting this analysis as exclusive.
First, another concept of liberty-positive liberty or personal
autonomy-emphasizes the freedom to control one's own life and
decisions.135 Berlin distinguishes this familiar idea from, but acknowledges its interconnections with, the desire for status and recognition. Because we are all involved in a context of relationships
which shape and circumscribe our individual selves, the liberty we
seek-especially if we belong to an oppressed group-may include
"an alteration of the attitude towards [us] of those whose opinions
and behaviour help to determine" our self-images and our identities.13 In borrowing Berlin's insights, however, I do not feel constrained to accept his categories. I would argue instead that positive liberty does include at least some portion of the desire for
recognition and respect as an equal, autonomous self,
even-perhaps especially-when that desire is strengthened by our
experience as members of a group often treated as "not quite fully
human, and therefore not quite fully free. 1

37

If the equal liberty

that the first amendment protects includes this concept of positive
liberty, as well as the notion of negative liberty, then the absolutist
libertarian version of the first amendment remains inadequate. It
fails sufficiently to account for the experience of freedom as proIf someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny
it to him even though it would be in the general interest to do so. This ... antiutilitarian concept of [a] right ... marks the distinctive concept of an individual

right against the State which is the heart ...of constitutional theory in the
United States.
Id.
I. BERLIN, supra note 77, at 131:
I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being,
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to my
own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree I believe this to be true, and
enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.

135

Id.
130
Id. at 156; cf. Williams, supra note 12, at 151 ("fundamental part of ourselves and of
our dignity is dependent upon the uncontrollable, powerful, external observers who constitute society").
137See I. BERLIN, supra note 77, at 156-57. Berlin's own use of the terms "liberated,"
"liberty," and "free" to describe this desire deconstructs his insistence that it is "akin to,
but not itself, freedom." Id. at 158.
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tection or release from nongovernmental social constraints-imposed by an aggregate of private choices-that interfere with the construction of a social-and-individual self (the only
self we can ever know).1 8 In fact, many first amendment theorists
accept something close to this type of individual autonomy, either
as the primary justification for or as an important purpose of the
first amendment."3 '
Second, as Ronald Dworkin has argued, there may be no right,
in the strong sense of the word, to negative liberty at all. 140 Once
we distinguish between basic liberties (such as freedom of speech)
that are intended to fence off certain human actions from government interference, and trivial ones (such as freedom from traffic
laws) that are not, then the primary value defended is not liberty
itself but rather the particularliberty at stake. The focus correspondingly shifts to our reasons for designating any particular liberty as basic.14 1 Utilitarian answers concerning the general good
cannot serve to justify individual rights since they are rights asserted against the majority and in spite of their potential detriment to society. 142 But in constructing a theory of rights that includes freedom of speech as a basic liberty, Dworkin argues, the
foundation principle turns out to be, not liberty, but equality. This
principle of equality protects "the right to treatment as an equal,"
explained not as "the right ... to an equal distribution of some
good or opportunity" but as "the right to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how ...goods and opportunities are to be distributed."' 14 3 Even though Dworkin does not fully
defend this portion of his theory of rights, it provides a perspective
from which to critique the libertarian conception of the first
1"8 John Stuart Mill

made a similar argument (though not, of course, about the first

amendment):
[Society's] means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts ... of its political
functionaries.... [S]ocial tyranny [can be] more formidable than many kinds of
political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it
leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of
life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the
magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the
prevailing opinion and feeling ....
J. MILL, supra note 73, at 4.
"

"
142

See supra note 56 (citing examples).
See supra note 134 (quoting Dworkin).
See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 271.
Id.

14' Id. at 273.
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amendment as primarily a device for repelling government intrusions on our lives. In particular, Dworkin's approach enables us to
challenge the libertarian resistance to the possibility that we can
use government and law to expand-not just to constrict-opportunities for freedom of speech.
The first amendment arguably may establish a right to free
speech as a right to "equal treatment," meaning that everyone is
entitled to the same free speech resources as everyone else-a "one
person, one voice" rule parallel to "one person, one vote. '144 There
is an intuitive appeal to the requirement of strict distributive justice when dealing with fundamental rights. But it seems unworkable in practice for many reasons,1 4 5 and, in any event, it is unnecessary for my purposes here. Even if the equal right to free speech
is a right only to "equal concern and respect," that right can be
violated by private as well as state action that inflicts the disempowerments of prejudice.1 4 6 It can be vindicated by government
protection of the victims of prejudice from the silencing or distortion of their voices.
The state can enrich public debate by regulating at least some
forms of prejudiced speech in order to combat prejudice, without
privileging any particular set of ideas. If we start with the observation that the playing field is not level, but tilted to favor the status
quo-in this case, racism and sexism-then the state's intervention
144

See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (if votes of citizens in one part

of state have ten times weight of citizens' votes in another part, "it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted"); id. at 565 ("[f]ull and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in [legislative
elections]"). Similarly, full participation in society may require that each citizen have an
equally effective voice in social and cultural arrangements that we usually think of as private or apolitical.
145 Voices, for example, are less definable than votes, which haven't proved very easy to
define either. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 1062-95 (exploring complexities of determining when one person, one vote principle is satisfied).
146 Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 1438. Treating each individual with equal regard
means "singl[ing] out for special scrutiny and probable invalidation those disadvantageous
political judgments which seem likely to reflect a preference based upon prejudice." Id.
Though this comment focuses on government choices, Tribe elsewhere questions the state
action requirement, id. at 1698-1720, noting that although the Supreme Court has no "general theory of liberty allocating public and private responsibility," id. at 1698, in practice it
makes choices, based on "perceptions of what we do not believe particular constitutional
provisions should be read to control," id. at 1720. The disagreement over regulations of
racist speech is, in part, a clash between different "perceptions" of the legitimate reach of
constitutional provisions that protect liberty and equality.
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can be limited to efforts to remove the tilt and level the field.147 By

recognizing that "contemporary social structure is as much an enemy of free speech as is the policeman,""14 we can liberate our concept of free speech to permit regulation based on content when
necessary to ensure that all speakers have, not equal speech resources, but equal opportunities to develop them. The first amendment permits the state to impose at least some regulations to deter
ostensibly private prejudiced speech acts that directly interfere
with the victims' self-determination and equality and indirectly
impoverish public debate by silencing their voices. 149 The principle

of free speech, from the perspective of the victim of prejudice who
seeks an equal opportunity to express her views to a listening audience, justifies regulations that remove barriers to her equal access-both to her own possibilities of self-expression and to her
potential audience.
Nonetheless, this equality-based theory of free speech is open
to several criticisms. If private social arrangements encourage and
solidify prejudice and inequality, the state itself may-more likely
than not-simply give those arrangements political form and substance. Social power has always translated readily into political
power; dominant groups have more often used government to enforce their dominance than subordinate groups have used it to restore a democratic balance. 150 Even if we assign the judiciary, as
the most independent and least political branch of government,
the task of questioning the government's regulations to ensure that
they actually enhance individual autonomy and enrich public de'17 I realize that substituting one metaphor for another does not change the requirements of analysis. If the state cannot provide a neutral matrix or framework within which
we can fairly bargain about our political future, presumably it can't provide a level playing
field either. The argument here, though, is that we should recognize the ways in which existing social and political arrangements skew the game and make attempts to counteract
them. It would be fatuous to claim that acknowledging our biases and seeking to minimize
their harms will restore us to an "original" state of innocent neutrality.
' Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1415 (1986). Professor Fiss argues persuasively that traditional free speech doctrine as applied in modern Supreme Court decisions impoverishes rather than enriches public debate by preferring (negative) autonomy to collective self-determination. See id. at 1416-17.
149 Cf. id. at 1417 (Supreme Court decisions that reject the "heckler's veto" not only
permit but require state intervention where "necessary to make the speaker's autonomy
'real' or 'effective' ").
180 See id. at 1418; Gale & Strossen, supra note 6, at 175-76. But the first amendment
itself is an example of using government to counteract its own tendencies towards oppression and orthodoxy. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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bate by encouraging "outsider" speech,1 51 we have no assurance
that judges will invariably or even frequently arrive at the right
answer. Moreover, challenges to a government regulation seldom
reflect the full range of its effects. If legislative and administrative
authorities intentionally or inadvertently have furthered censorship and stifled diversity in the name of restricting the harms of
prejudice, 52 judicial correctives may not occur in time to protect
many potential legitimate exercises of the right to free expression.
In addition, they may not fully counteract the chilling effects that
accompany even the failed attempt to regulate protected speech.
Regulation is justified only if the risk of harm that prejudiced
speech causes to positive liberty and equality, outweighs the risk of
harm that regulation causes to protected speech. That, it seems, is
an empirical inquiry to which the persistence of racism and similar
prejudices begins to provide the reply. The reply becomes more
complete if we limit regulation of prejudiced speech acts to those
narrowly defined categories that cause, if not the worst harms, the
harms that we believe can be counteracted without destroying the
values of free expression.1 5"
Another, perhaps more fundamental, criticism of this theory
of free speech contends that equality norms work in precise contradiction to my account of them. Professor Kenneth Karst, among
others, has argued that "the principle of equal liberty lies at the
heart of the first amendment's protections against government regulation of the content of speech."1'54 Comparing equal liberty of expression to the equal right to vote,1 55 Karst maintains that the
equal right to freedom of speech means the equal right to be free
of government controls. 156 Yet it is possible to deconstruct'51 7 even
I'l

See supra note 56 (describing outsider jurisprudence).

152 See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (invali-

dating broad university regulations designed to combat prejudice).
153 See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
11, Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REv.
20, 21 (1975) [hereinafter Karst, Equality]; see also Karst, supra note 8, at 117 ("members
of every subordinated group need an expansively defined first amendment" to establish
their identities and liberate their voices).
Karst, Equality, supra note 154, at 26; Karst, supra note 8, at 117.
158 See Karst, Equality,supra note 154, at 23-24. This may be an example of an "equal
treatment" approach to free speech, in the sense that the demand for content neutrality
provides each person with the same arguments to use against government regulation of her
speech. Id. at 52-54. Even though content neutrality is incomplete, each person faces the
same theoretical gaps, however defined, except insofar as the courts fail to apply the doctrine consistently from case to case. See supra notes 53, 56-66 and accompanying text.
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the cases that Karst uses to exemplify his contention that equality
as neutrality is a central principle of the first amendment. For instance, writing for the Court in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 158 Justice Marshall observed both that "the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content, ' 15' and that "government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard. ' '1 60 He thus assumed that the first
proposition (removing governmental power to regulate messages)
necessarily fulfilled the requirement of the second (governmentally
provided equal access for all viewpoints). 61 But if government's
failure to restrict certain messages (such as racist ones) guarantees
that other messages (such as the views of the victims of racism)
will not have an equal opportunity to be formulated, articulated,
or heard, then either the decision is unintelligible or we must
choose which of the propositions is more fundamental to the first
amendment's guarantee of equal liberty. Although traditional libertarians would choose the first proposition, egalitarian reformers
may, with equal propriety, choose the second. Even if the facts involved in Mosley seem to support the priority of the first proposition, it can be argued that when the facts change, the priorities
change. If narrow restrictions of the directly repressive speech of
dominant groups or individuals will encourage the controversial
speech of dissident groups and individuals, the purposes of the
first amendment may be better served by such restrictions. Karst
himself declares that Mosley's determinative principle "requires
courts to start from the assumption that all speakers and all points
of view are entitled to a hearing, and permits deviation from this
1 62
basic assumption only upon a showing of substantial necessity.
Another reinterpretation of Professor Karst's theory examines
157In the colloquial sense, that is. I am not here claiming to apply deconstruction in the
rigorous manner that might be required by disciples of Jacques Derrida. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 743-44 (1987) (describing how legal
scholars misappropriate deconstructive techniques).
158408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court used equal protection analysis to invalidate
city regulation which prohibited all picketing near schools except for labor unions. Id. at
101-02.
:59 Id. at 95.
" Id. at 96.

161See Karst, Equality, supra note 154, at 27-28. Karst quotes these passages together,
without suggesting that there is any potential tension or conflict between them. Id.
...Id. at 28.
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the permitted deviation in light of his dual contentions that equal
liberty of expression "has special relevance for protecting the
downtrodden' ' 1 3 and that "[a] showing of high probability of seri-

ous harm might justify regulation of a particular kind of speech
content."'" 4 Victims of racist and sexist speech are more "downtrodden" than its speakers, and serious harm, at least from some
subsets of prejudiced speech, is highly probable, if not virtually
certain."6 5 Nonetheless-at least in 1975-Karst rejected restrictions on racist speech. He argued instead that even regulations of
"abusive speech" are applied unequally to restrict the speech of
"racial and political minorities" rather than that of prejudiced
majoritarian speakers. 66 More recently, he reaffirmed that perspective, describing speakers protected by the Supreme Court's
free speech jurisprudence as "outsiders" who were subordinated,
labeled (as unreasonable, disloyal, or both), and silenced by dominant majorities. 6 ' Yet nothing in his theory entirely precludes the
recognition that messages of white supremacy, conveyed by nongovernmental speakers in a manner that causes direct and irreparable harm to racial minorities, may deserve less protection than
other messages; indeed, such supremacist messages form part of
the system of racial oppression that Karst strongly opposes.' If
many first amendment decisions of the Warren Court were important "because the Court authoritatively declared that black people
were citizens whose voices deserved to be heard,"' then it should
be equally important to make the same declaration today-by our
refusal to permit racists to use first amendment rules crafted for
another era to label and silence blacks as outsiders unworthy of
equal participation in community, or university, life.7
'63 Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
16' But see id. at 33 (characterizing as "unfortunate" decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379 (1973) (city civil rights laws
may ban sex segregation of help-wanted advertisements)).
166 Id. at 38.
164

167 See Karst, supra note 8, at 109-11.
168 Cf. Karst, Equality, supra note 154, at 51 (although equality-based prohibitions of
government control of speech content do not solve problem of private censorship by media,
equality justifies only content-neutral regulations).

160 Karst, supra note 8, at 123.

170 See id. at 135 n.160. Perhaps because it was written before some of the recent critiques of traditional first amendment doctrine, Professor Karst's most recent article never
directly addresses arguments similar to the ones made here. Compare id. at 136 n.166 (apparently conceding that laws may forbid sexual harassment "even though it may consist of
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The proposed equality-based theory of the first amendment
permits government regulation of some categories of racist speech
to combat the deep and continuing individual and social harms of
prejudice. It looks to history, social context, and personal experience to tell us which kinds of prejudice are sufficiently severe and
pervasive to justify regulation, and to the values of the first
amendment to help us construct a test that will combine categorization and balancing analyses 1 ' to protect as much free expression
as possible-without preferring dominant to subordinate speakers.
Although I think that this theory can be justified on its own by the
first amendment's equal liberty principle, it is strengthened and
sharpened by the fourteenth amendment's protection of equality.172 Even if the framers of the fourteenth amendment consciously chose to constitutionalize equality norms only in opposition to state-inflicted prejudice, their-and our-ultimate purpose
seems to be the disestablishment of prejudice as a system of arbitrary disadvantage and dispossession. If we now recognize more
clearly that private actions serve to maintain the system, government failure to check them may operate not unlike government
support of prejudice. At least since Brown v. Board of Education,11 3 we have both acknowledged the message of stigma as one
of the primary harms of racism and treated educational institutions as a focal point for the constitutionally mandated transformation from a society marked by racial prejudice and oppression
to one distinguished instead by equal respect and equal rights.
If the constitutional principle of free speech is an important
reason to discount the harms that speech can inflict in drawing the
speech and speech alone") with id. at 139 & n.175 (opposing feminist attacks on pornography because "[iut is dangerous for any subordinated group... to define expressive behavior
outside the freedom of expression because [it effectively] convey[s] its message" and because "regulating speech because of its expected effects on attitudes, with eventual consequences in harmful acts, is just what some 70 years' worth of liberating first amendment
jurisprudence has labored to forbid").
17 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 790-94 (distinguishing "balancing" from "categorization" as methods of first amendment analysis). Professor Tribe prefers categorical
rules as "usually less open to manipulation," id. at 793, but concedes that balancing is
nearly always necessary when government arguably restricts protected expression while pursuing one or more legitimate goals. Id. at 791, 794.
17 Although I will not here construct the argument, thirteenth amendment jurisprudence invalidating even privately imposed "badges or incidents" of slavery also supports
reading the first amendment to guarantee equality as well as liberty. See, e.g., The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("[thirteenth amendment] has a reflex character . ..

establishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom").
13

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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line between permissible and impermissible government regulations, the constitutional principle of antidiscrimination is an
equally important reason to redraw the line when speech itself inflicts the harms that the antidiscrimination principle is intended to
prohibit. Insofar as the fourteenth amendment also incorporates a
principle of affirmative action-either permitting or (in some instances) requiring government action to counteract racism and its
continuing harms-the line may shift further toward regulation
and away from unrestricted individual liberty to inflict the harms
that the 4fourteenth amendment compels us as a society to
17
prevent.

In a very different context, the Supreme Court has already
ruled that later amendments to the Constitution may affect the
interpretation of the first amendment.17 Even if those cases are
questionable or open to narrowing interpretation or both, they
demonstrate another meaning of Chief Justice Marshall's comment
that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.' 7 6 The Constitution is not just a list of discrete powers
and rights, or even a blueprint (though I have used that metaphor
in this Article 177 ) for constructing our government; rather, it is the

foundational structure itself. Its parts must be interpreted in relation to each other and to the whole.178 As one point alone in space

cannot define any geometric figure, yet two points can together define a line and three a triangle, 79 so the Constitution's mul74

See supra note 52.

"I In a somewhat peculiar line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the twentyfirst amendment, granting states primary control over liquor traffic, permits greater state
regulation of sexually explicit expression than the first amendment would otherwise allow.
See, e.g., City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 95 (1986) (broad powers of state conferred by twenty-first amendment outweigh any first amendment interest); New York State
Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 717 (1981) (same); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109,
114 (1972) (twenty-first amendment confers more than normal state authority over public
health, welfare and morals). Professor Tribe argues that these cases stand "not for the proposition that the twenty-first amendment overrides the first but for the more modest notion
that... state[s] [have] power to zone strong sexual stimuli away from places where liquor is
served." L. TRME, supra note 86, at 478 n.15. I am indebted to my colleague, David
Treiman, for calling my attention to this general point.
17' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
'7 See supra text accompanying note 92.
178 See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1969) (setting forth structural considerations); cf. L.

TRIE,

33-67

supra note 86, at 10 n.2 (even

though Constitution does not express "any single, coherent vision or philosophy.... it is to
the entire Constitution, and not just some parts, that we owe our allegiance") (emphasis in
original).
179 One can not carry this metaphor very far, though, without encountering difficulty.
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tidimensional provisions and their values can serve to situate us on
a map we should at least consult if not follow. This command
should have special force when the provisions to be interpreted
have become as central to our sense of fundamental rights and relationships under law as the first amendment's guarantee of free
expression and the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equality.
V. EQUAL

LIBERTY AND RACIST SPEECH: REGULATING
DISCRIMINATORY VERBAL HARASSMENT ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS

The argument thus far is that the first amendment, reinforced
by the fourteenth, contains a principle of equal liberty that permits regulating some categories of racist and similarly prejudiced
speech to prevent serious harms to liberty and equality rights of
the victims and thus to the democratic dialogue through which we
continually reconstruct our society. The principle of equal liberty
is especially relevant when speakers in a university setting use
prejudiced speech as a weapon to destroy the right to educational
equality of blacks, women, and other devalued minorities, and to
deny them equal access to university dialogue and dispute. Education, like the vote, is a right preservative of other rights.8 0 It is
fundamental not only to individual self-realization but to democratic self-governance as well. If we can ever construct rules that
successfully balance the rights and liberties of dominant and
subordinate groups in hopes of creating a more just and equal society, the university, increasingly a site of racist and sexist incidents,
seems like an appropriate and necessary place to begin.
Libertarians-even those who are not first amendment absolutists-often argue, however, that universities are the last, best
refuge of free speech and the last place where speech regulations
should be considered, much less adopted and enforced. 181 Because
Six points-or sixty-could provide a bewildering array of options, unless-as is true of the
Constitution-they are not points at all but substantive and differentiated propositions.
Moreover, even if each of them was entirely clear and distinct (which each is not), without
some preceding rule (or set of rules) for making choices or ordering priorities our structure
may be indeterminate and malleable. But constructing those rules is one function of constitutional interpretation and adjudication.
'60 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (right to vote is "fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights"); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,
489 (1975) (affirming validity of Yick Wo); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)
(same).
181E.g., CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, A SPECIAL REPORT:
CAMPUS LIFE, IN SEARCH OF COMMUNITY 20-23 (1990) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (re-
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the university is dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge and the
freedoms of inquiry and belief that are central tenets of traditional
first amendment doctrine, perhaps it cannot embrace even those
deterrent rules (like statutes forbidding threats, invasion of privacy, intimidation, or harassment) that are permissible in the surrounding world. The university, it is argued, is the quintessential
marketplace of ideas. The speakers-even racist speakers-are
constitutionally approved sellers, and the students who hear and
evaluate their ideas are the idealized consumers whose interests
and choices the first amendment is also designed to protect. 182
Assuming that the primary purpose of speech regulation is to
enforce decency, civility, and respect, proponents of this view then
easily move to the conclusion that "[i]t may sometimes be necessary in a university for civility and mutual respect to be superseded by the need to guarantee free expression.

' 18 3

Instead of re-

stricting "slurs and epithets intended to discredit another's race,
ethnic group, religion, or sex," a Yale University committee
declared,
[e]ven when some members of the university community fail to
meet their social and ethical responsibilities, the paramount obligation of the university is to protect their right to free expression.
...

If the university's overriding commitment to free expression is

to be sustained, secondary social and ethical responsibilities must
be left to84 the informal processes of suasion, example, and
argument.1

This somewhat repetitive assertion, however, asks and answers
only the wrong questions. It balances the powerful and primary
rights of free expression for racist speakers against the relatively
weak and "secondary" rights of their victims to "civility" and "rejecting "restrictive [speech] codes" and urging universities instead to "define high standards
of civility and condemn... any violation of such standards").
182For a more sophisticated version of this argument, see Post, supra note 1, at 319-25.
Professor Post distinguishes three different concepts of education-civic (intended to inculcate respect for existing authority and community norms), democratic (intended to create
"autonomous citizens, capable of fully participating in the rough and tumble world of public
discourse"), and critical (intended to "discover and disseminate knowledge" and truth). Id.
at 319-22. He identifies the third as most closely linked to market theories of the first
amendment. Id. at 323.
'83 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 181, at 21 (quoting Yale University committee's 1975
report, later incorporated into Yale undergraduate regulations).
184

Id.
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spect.' 1 85 It focuses almost exclusively on the perpetrators (those
who "fail to meet their social and ethical responsibilities"). It entirely ignores the victims' primary rights to educational and expressive equality. It nowhere acknowledges that the commitment
to eradicate racism and ensure equality is part of the same Constitution that protects free expression, 1 8 or even that the constitutional value of equality engenders cultural values that are centrally
important to university life. 1 87 Moreover, this position fails to perceive that the first amendment is structured to protect, not just
liberty, but equal liberty, and never confronts the university's responsibility to provide an educational environment in which all
students alike can pursue knowledge, truth, and self-determination. Like the libertarian arguments criticized earlier, this approach simply prefers-without serious explanation or justification-the speakers' freedom and autonomy, and their contributions to educational discourse, to those of the victims.
The marketplace metaphor used to support this vision of the
university is itself flawed and inapposite. 8 8 By more appropriately
"" The term "respect" in this context seems to mean something like "politeness" or
"consideration"-something much less than either the connotations I have invoked throughout this Article or "the right to equal concern and respect" that Dworkin identifies as cen-

tral to equality. See R. DWORKIN,

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,

supra note 7, at 180-83, 272-73;

supra text accompanying note 143.

11"But see

CARNEGIE REPORT,

supra note 181, at 25-35 (university must honor "the

sacredness of each person" and aggressively pursue "diversity"). The Report's chapter urging interracial and multicultural understanding, id., immediately follows its chapter demanding that "freedom of expression [be] uncompromisingly protected," id. at 17-23. Yet,
there is no explicit (or implicit) recognition of possible contradictions between the two. The
Report even quotes (with approval) Princeton University's prohibition of sexual harassment,
defined as "verbal or physical conduct" that "has the effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work, academic performance, or living conditions by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment," id. at 34, without acknowledging that this rule may
clash with uncompromising protection of freedom of expression. For two interesting attempts to resolve the tensions that the Carnegie Report ignores, see Balkin, supra note 58,
at 421-24; Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 1, 3-5, 33-51
(1990).
"' Although constitutional law (as currently structured) does not govern a private university in the same way that it governs a public one, the same constitutional culture affects
them both. Cf. Grey, supra note 21, at 9 n.14 (explicitly assuming that private universities
accept obligation to provide equal opportunities to women and students of color).
1"I The marketplace of ideas is, in practice, profoundly racist and sexist. See Lawrence,
supra note 10, at 467-72 (racism causes whites to discount the needs and rights of persons of
color, to reject their own similar needs and deny their shared humanity, to devalue ideas of
nonwhites, and to silence their voices). For other effective demolitions of the market metaphor, see Baker, supra note 75, at 974-83 (critiquing marketplace as favoring dominant
groups); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5
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focusing on the notion of "public discourse"18' 9 or "public dialogue,"19 0 or even open, serious, and searching conversation among
friends or colleagues, 9 " we come closer to the ideals of both "democratic" and "critical" education as defined by Professor Post; such
education enhances effective participation in the democratic process and embraces disciplined pursuit of knowledge. 192 We also
come closer to the educational ideal of self-discovery or self-fulfillment, including possibilities for passion, creativity, experimentation, and intellectual play. None of these values is easily captured
within a metaphor of purchase and sale. 9 '
(government regulation may be needed to connect failures in communicative market similar
to failures in economic market).
119 See generally Post, supra note 1, at 279 (defining "public discourse" as "communication deemed necessary for the processes of democracy").
90 See Denvir & powell, Caliban's Complaint: Racist Speech and the First Amendment 24 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (arguing that "the operative concept" in Justice Brandeis' theory of first amendment "is a public dialogue as the
decision-making tool of democracy"). Denvir and powell contend that this model strongly
implies that government has an "active duty to promote a public dialogue in which all can
participate." Id. at 25. They continue:
If we substitute the "dialogue" metaphor for that of a "market place of ideas"
we get a different perspective on the proper role of speech in a democracy. Instead
of a laissez-faire approach which sees the only evil as the suppression of speech
based on its message, we envision a government which aims at "husbanding" our
public dialogue. The primary goal of the First Amendment is now seen as the
establishment of the preconditions for an intelligent conversation between political equals.
Id. at 27.
191 The most important self- and society-constructing discourse, dialogue, or conversation is not necessarily "public," unless we give the word a very broad meaning. If we first
construct ourselves and often interact with our culture within a network of overlapping
communities, some of which are clearly "private" as we commonly use the term, and others
of which commingle "public" and "private" characteristics, then one of the more perplexing
tasks for first amendment doctrine is to identify which of those communities are, or should
be, linked by formal law or informal cultural norms to its implied commands. For a discussion of communities, see supra note 28.
192 See Post, supra note 1, at 321-24. We also come closer even to "civic education," see
id. at 319, if the notion is redefined (as I think it could be) to focus on education not as
indoctrination (or inoculation) with existing community values as filtered through the perceptions of educational decision-makers but rather as education that explores and explains
both historical and current justifications for those values, at the same time that it recognizes
the essential open-endedness of the democratic process.
M Curiously enough, however, the law-and-economics school of analysis, for all its
shortcomings and coldheartedness, occasionally seems more to appreciate-and to make legal room for-the quirks of human personality, the surprises of creative thought, and the
nondestructive pleasures of irrationality than do many of the feminist scholars, critical race
theorists, new communitarians, or adherents of critical legal studies-even though the latter
groups all, in one form or another, contend that they are attempting to give the law a,
friendlier, more human face. Perhaps the reason is simply that one of the unfair benefits of
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When the liberty of some is furthered at the expense of the
liberty and equality of others, both the university and the first
amendment suffer. A university that seeks to provide both "democratic" and "critical" education is dedicated not only to universal
freedom but to universal education-to equal opportunities and
equal rights of participation and self-realization for students of all
races, religions, and economic classes, both sexes, and any sexual
orientation. Leaving some persons out of the academic circle for
arbitrary reasons is not only a moral wrong and a personal injury,
it is also an intellectual mistake that impoverishes the dialogue
and impedes the search for truth. The ideal university would welcome everyone seeking knowledge and the wisdom to use it, without regard to characteristics like race or sex that may deeply affect
identity and experience but that are, nonetheless, essentially irrelevant to the desire and capacity to learn and to the ability to light a
path for others. The ideal university would educate its students for
a wide variety of jobs and lives, based upon their diverse talents,
needs, and choices. It would guide intellectual exploration, stimulate artistic expression, instill political awareness and moral complexity, and channel, protect, and encourage the risk-taking and
experimentation through which we discover and create ourselves.
It would ask and expect its students to talk to each other across
the boundaries of race, sex, class, and religion, to hear and to value
dissonant voices. It would teach them to participate vigorously, effectively, and maybe even civilly, 94 in their shared community,

while preparing them to thrive in the world outside and to restructure that world together as democratic citizens. Even the real university, which must cope with the stubborn distractions of everyday life and with the intractable realities of prejudice, may aspire
to these ideals.
The failure to regulate at least some subset of prejudiced
speech can directly undermine this vision of the university. Some
victims of prejudice leave the campus, forfeiting their educational
cultural dominance is the opportunity to experiment with moral unseriousness.
19 Emphasizing the virtues of civility strikes me as both mistaken and dangerous. The
notion of civility radically misconceives and diminishes the goals of educational and political
equality and of democratic pluralism or multiculturalism, replacing the desire and the right
to autonomy and respect (in the strong sense) with (at its worst) a simplistic preference for
the forms of dialogue over the substance of genuine communication and response. Norms of
civility can chill adventurous investigation of facts and ideas and discourage strong expressions of feelings or opinions. Nothing is gained if we lie to each other in "nicer" language,
while the realities of political power and oppression remain unchanged.
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rights altogether, while others flee to the comparative safety of
home ground-colleges where their own race, sex, or religion predominates. Even minority students who remain on campus may
adjust their own conduct to minimize the threat of repeated verbal
aggression, becoming alienated from the educational community
while ostensibly remaining within it, dissimulating their views, displacing their racial, cultural, or sexual identity, diminishing their
contributions to learning, teaching, and scholarship, and denying-perhaps even to themselves-their own pain and withdrawal.19 5 When the victims of prejudiced speech relinquish the
opportunity they once sought to confront new ideas and to communicate with people of different backgrounds and viewpoints,
both they and the perpetrators-and society as a whole-suffer the
kind of losses the first amendment seems designed to prevent. Our
devotion to the heroic ideal has too often blinded us to these
harms. Like Macbeth's guests, we need to look behind the veil of
familiar realities, to see the ghosts that inhabit our world.
How, then, can and should the university respond to racist,
sexist, and similarly prejudiced speech? Despite everything I have
written so far, I do not mean to discount the dangers of encouraging educational authorities, who already wield a substantial
amount of democratically unaccountable power, to consult their intuitions in deciding who shall speak and what shall be said on the
college campus. The second-best first amendment-the one that
warns us not to let any government control our words and our
thoughts' 9 6-is, in many respects, the only one we have. I have argued, perhaps more tentatively than my rhetorical style may sug195 See generally Davis, supra note 9, at 1565-71 (describing how racism injures the
self, undermines self-esteem, and skews behavior of those who encounter it as part of every-

day life); Delgado, supra note 17, at 135-47 (same); Lawrence, supra note 10, at 448, 468-72
(same); Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2326-27, 2336-40 (same). In a widely-quoted passage, Pro-

fessor Patricia Williams explains how white students' defacement of a Beethoven poster
-their literally figurative rejection of blackness as consistent with greatness-obliterates
black (and by extension, female) freedom, accomplishment, and participation in Western

culture:
[I]f I ever manage to create something as significant, as monumental, and as important as Beethoven's music, . . if I am that great in genius, and perfect in
ability-then the best reward to which I can aspire, and the most cherishing gesture with which my recognition will be preserved, is that I will be remembered as
white. Maybe even a white man.
Williams, supra note 11, at 2135.
19 See generally F. SCHAUER, supra note 52, at 157-58 (free speech principle stems
from skepticism of government power and of democratic choice of leaders); Schauer, supra
note 23, at 2 (free speech principle embodies "risk-adverse distrust of decisionmakers").
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gest, in favor of reimagining the first amendment to encompass
both an idea of affirmative liberty and an enforceable right to
equal liberty. Together these encompass the freedom to construct
an authentic self, who can make her own choices and explore her
own possibilities, and who can participate fully and effectively in
democratic self-governance. The first problem, therefore, may be
to identify the categories of racist speech which most threaten that
idea, that right, and that freedom. The first question may be
whether the university can find a means to regulate them.
Unfortunately, both the problem and the question have unsettling answers. The prejudiced speech or expressive act that causes
the deepest injury may well be the insensitive or ignorant remark
that occurs in the give-and-take of daily conversation or classroom
discussion,1 97 or the signifying behavior of words or gestures that
form the microaggression of unconscious or partly-conscious racism; 9 8 each reconfirms "the tyranny of the prevailing opinion" 199
that the perspectives and contributions of blacks, women, religious
minorities, and gays and lesbians simply are not important within
the dominant culture. Yet it seems extraordinarily difficult to impose restrictions on such expression without sweeping within the
net of regulation the kind of political or self-constitutive speech
that first amendment values most strongly protect. Only the most
artless of regulation drafters have even tried.0 0
,97See Note, Racism, supra note 10, at 323-27.
The daily repetition of subtle racism and subordination in the classroom and
on campus can ultimately be, for African Americans, more productive of stress,
anxiety, and alienation than even blatant racist acts. The subtle institutional racism and white cultural bias that pervades the campus infringes on black students' right to equal enjoyment of their civil right to an education....
[B]lack perspectives are not part of the campus culture or community consciousness. Black students attend class (and take exams) often having just confronted offensive reminders of either overt racial hostility or subtle racial insensitivity-perhaps in the campus newspaper, on posters at the bus stop, the
structure of classroom discussion-that serve as distractions from academic performance that white students do not endure.
Id. at 323.
19I See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 1565-68 (discussing microaggression); Lawrence,
supra note 3, at 330-39, 347-55 (arguing that modern psychology recognizes unconscious
sources of racial antagonism and that equal protection theory must incorporate our knowledge of unconscious motivations in order to combat racism).
199 J.MILL, supra note 73, at 4.
ZOOSee Grey, supra note 21, at 10-13 (discussing University of Michigan regulation invalidated in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989));
Post, supra note 1, at 268-70 (describing regulations originally adopted at University of
Connecticut).
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Another approach has been to annex expressions of racial hostility to the Supreme Court's discredited "fighting words" doc20 2

trine. 201 The authors of the Yale University report quoted above

seemed to believe that the most important subset of racist speech
consists of "slurs and epithets intended to discredit another's race,
ethnic group, religion, or sex." 203 (Nonetheless, they found such remarks unregulable.) Professor Richard Delgado has argued that racial insults are among "the most pervasive channels through which
discriminatory attitudes are imparted," 204 that certain epithets are
"only calculated to wound" and have "[n]o other use,

' 20 5

that ef-

fective response and redress currently do not exist,208 and that,
therefore, we should create a tort action for racial insults. 07 Professor Thomas Grey, a primary author of the Stanford Fundamental StandardInterpretationthat prohibits discriminatory harassment, similarly focuses on "personal vilification" that makes use of
201 See, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
528 (1972). Houston-Gooding sharply limited the ruling in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), which stated that some words are beyond first amendment protection
because they are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas," and because "their very
utterance inflict[s] injury" or "tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at
571-72. For concise but detailed criticism of the fighting words doctrine, see L. TRIBE, supra
note 86, at 837-41, 849-52.
202 See supra notes 183-84 and accompE-iying text.
203 See CARNEWO
REPORT, supra note 181, at 21 (quoting Yale undergraduate

regulations).
204 Delgado, supra note 17, at 135.
205 Id. at 145. But see id. at 180 (recognizing that at least some racial epithets may be
"spoken affectionately" among members of group epithet usually derogates).
206

Id. at 146-47.

See, e.g., id. at 134, 149, 165 (arguing for independent tort action for racial hate
speech). Oddly, Professor Delgado rejects any parallel between racist and sexist insults:
[R]acial insults are in no way comparable to statements such as "You are a God
damned woman and a God damned liar," which the Restatement [(Second) of
Torts] gives as an example of a "mere insult." Racial insults are different qualitatively because they conjure up the entire history of racial discrimination in this
country.
Id. at 157. Sex-based insults conjure up the entire history of sexism in this country (and the
world), including male violence committed against women both because they are women and
because they are often physically or psychologically incapable of fighting back.
I nonetheless agree with Delgado and the Restatement that the remark quoted above,
in the particular context in which it was hypothetically made (over the phone to a telephone
operator), is not and should not be actionable. But in some contexts it could function as the
kind of discriminatory verbal harassment that I believe can be regulated by a college or
university to protect the victim's right to educational equality (including the right to equal
participation in campus dialogue) without seriously impairing the speaker's free speech
interests.
207
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"[i]nsulting or 'fighting' words or non-verbal symbols."2 08 According to Grey, this regulation combines the "relevant common elements" of the "fighting words" and "intentional infliction of emotional distress"
rationales and adapts them to the campus
20 9
setting.
Nonethless, for reasons that have been, for the most part, sufficiently discussed by others, 210 both the "fighting words" doctrine
and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress seem
problematic models for regulating any expression, even prejudiced
speech, on the university campus. Like group defamation, these
categories may be inextricable from vigorous political debate. 211 In
addition, they effectively belittle the emotional, nonrational components of human nature while seeming, paradoxically, to acknowledge them. The traditional conception of fighting words implies an
exchange involving white males who approve of and engage in instantaneous violent responses, 212 discharging emotions as if they
were automatic rifles. Such a concept diminishes both emotional
and moral complexity and has little or nothing to say to most
members of dominated groups like women and blacks, for whom
fighting back has often risked serious injury and death.21 3 (It probably doesn't have much to say even to most heterosexual white
208

See

STANFORD INTERPRETATION,

supra note 17, at 1; see also Grey, supra note 21, at

18-23 (rule "only prohibits a very narrow category of expression" in order to focus on objectively insulting speech that attacks victim's identity and to avoid vagueness and chilling
effect of broader regulation). The Stanford approach includes two other limitations with
which I partially agree. First, prohibited speech must be "intended to insult or stigmatize an
individual or a small number of individuals"on the basis of certain characteristics, including race and sex, which are strongly linked with arbitrary prejudice and disadvantage. See
STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 1. Second, prohibited speech must be "addressed directly" to those "whom it insults or stigmatizes." See id. Apart from the terms
"insult or stigmatize," which seem both too broad and too narrow, see infra text accompanying notes 223-26; cf. Smolla, supra note 58, at 209 (terms like "stigmatize" are too general
and subjective to survive constitutional scrutiny), I would impose similar limitations.
209 See Grey, supra note 21, at 20.
210 See,

e.g., L. TRIE, supra note 86, at 837-40, 849-55 ("fighting words"); STANFORD
supra note 17 (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Linzer, supra
note 17, at 222-26; Strossen, supra note 8, at 508-14 ("fighting words"), 514-17 (intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
212 See L. TREBE, supra note 86, at 926-27. But see Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 327-32 (1979) (arguing in favor of criminal restraints on group libel).
This Article almost suffices to make me reconsider the virtues of first amendment
absolutism.
212 See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 453-54 & n.93.
213 But see id. at 451-57 (arguing'that fighting words doctrine can be reconfigured to
support regulation of racial insults).
INTERPRETATION,
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males.) The "emotional distress" tort has customarily been ringed
with anxious reassurances that it would seldom apply, not because
of any deep concern for first amendment values,214 but because
claimants (like rape victims) are thought of as likely to be cheats
and liars.2 15 Yet for most of us, the experience of consciousness and
identity, of a self that persists over time and change and that relates to others within a complex of interconnected communities, is
constructed as much from passion as from reason.216
Moreover, none of these rationales for regulation-fighting
words, emotional distress, or group defamation-strikes through
the protective mask at the constitutional injury that racist or sexist speech inflicts on students who become its targets: the interference with the victim's first and fourteenth amendment rights to
equal voice, equal liberty, and equal education. Thus, these rationales also forfeit the constitutional base that, I have argued, entitles or even requires us to move the line between protected and
unprotected speech when the relevant rights are at stake. 1
21 But see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (first amendment prohibits public figure from recovering damages for emotional harm caused by profane, sexually
explicit parody published in nationally circulated magazine).
215 See Delgado, supra note 17, at 151-57. But see Love, Discriminatory Speech and
the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 123, 159
(1990) (arguing that tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, if somewhat modified, is "well suited to vindicate the rights of the victims of discriminatory harassment").
21 Justice Harlan got it right in his well-known opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971):
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Id. at 26. But see Karst, supra note 8, at 102 (questioning Harlan's dichotomy because
"cognition is not limited to the analytic mode" but also includes intuitive, holistic knowledge). Nonetheless, Karst opposes a "civic deliberation model of the first amendment" precisely because it "will be of little help when the purpose of expression is to reach the fears
that underlie group subordination." Id. at 147.
217 This perception and argument mark my primary disagreement with existing ACLU
policies, both National and California, even though I voted for them both (and played some
role in drafting them both, especially the California policy) on the grounds that each of
them was, for the organization involved, a positive step.
The National ACLU policy, which is reprinted in full as an appendix to Strossen, supra
note 8, at 571-73, "opposes all campus regulations which interfere with the freedom of
professors, students and administrators to teach, learn, discuss and debate or to express
ideas, opinions or feelings in classroom, public or private discourse." Id. at 571 (citation
omitted). I believe I recall writing that sentence; not surprisingly, I agree with it. The policy
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A better model can be found in the statutes, regulations, and
case law that prohibit even private employment discrimination
based on protected characteristics such as race or sex, and that restrict sexual and racial harassment in the workplace.1i Most areas
of the college campus function, in many important respects, more
like a workplace where prejudiced speech may be regulated than
like a public forum where nearly anything may be said. The college
classroom and the university itself are more than moral and intellectual-and physical-spaces for the exploration of ideas;2 19 they
are also places where students must work and often live, and perform successfully if they are to accomplish both their practical
goals (getting a degree) and their idealized ones (getting an education). The university is, in that sense, a company town. 2 Under
also opposes "disciplinary codes that reach beyond permissible boundaries into the realm of
protected speech, even when those codes are directed at the problems of bias on campus."
Id. I disagree with the location of those "permissible boundaries," at least as implied by the
policy's next paragraph and explanatory footnote:
This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from enacting disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimidation and invasion of
privacy. The fact that words may be used in connection with otherwise actionable
conduct does not immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). In one of the footnotes, the policy explains that the terms
"harassment," "intimidation," and "invasion of privacy" refer to
conduct which is legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed at [specific persons] and when intended to frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon its target. Threatening telephone calls to a minority student's dormitory room, for example, would be proscribable conduct under the terms of this
policy. Expressive behavior which has no other effect than to create an unpleasant
learning environment, however, would not be the proper subject of regulation.
Id. at 571 n.440. The implied model, therefore, is simply existing tort law, with a first
amendment gloss that would restrict some of its reach. There is nothing objectionable about
that approach per se, but it fails to recognize either the particular harms of discriminatory
verbal harassment or the constitutional implications of those harms when they interfere
with the expressive and educational rights of the victims.
The California ACLU policy, by contrast, does focus on the harms of discriminatory
harassment. See infra note 242 (quoting from policy). It never expressly states, however, the
theoretical underpinnings that I would give it, and one could accept its language while rejecting the theory.
21' See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (prohibiting
racial discrimination in private employment); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990) (same); see also
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. .57, 64-66 (1986) (affirming title VII protection
against sexual harassment that creates abusive, hostile, or offensive working environment);
Delgado, supra note 17, at 152-53 & nn.113-21 (discussing cases of workplace racial harassment); Strauss, supra note 186, at 1 n.2, 2 n.8, 7 n.21, 8 nn.23, 24-26, 12 n.43 (citing workplace sexual harassment cases).
219 Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (classroom is "marketplace of ideas"). The Court seemed unaware of any possible irony.
120 1 realize the inapposite connotations of that phrase, identified with Marsh v. Ala-
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current law, based on constitutional rights of equality, workers are
entitled to protection from racial, sexual, or religious harassment
that "unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual's work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 2 2 ' Students too should be entitled to a workplace environment that enables them to accomplish the job they came to
do-or at least to regulatory protection in that environment from
unjustified harms that imperil their task.
My argument, then, is that the first amendment permits (and,
coupled with the fourteenth amendment, may require222) the university to make reasonable efforts to provide an educational workplace free of at least some forms of discriminatory verbal harassment. Yet the first amendment also protects even vituperative,
cruel, misinformed, and prejudiced speech. Even when a particular
instance of expression falls clearly within the suspect category of
prejudiced speech, we need principles to guide us in balancing the
rights and liberties involved. I think that some principles can be
constructed, although I concede both that they will sometimes probama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), which held, in effect, that a privately-owned town's shopping
district was a public forum for first amendment purposes. Id. at 506-07. But the ultimate
meaning of Marsh may be that when a private institution takes on quasi-public responsibilities, it should be governed by the constitutional norms relevant to the function it performs.
Cf. Post, The Perils of Conceptualism:A Response to Professor Fallon, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1744, 1746 (1990).
[Sipeech that is appropriately protected when it occurs within public discourse is
also appropriately regulated as racial or sexual harassment when it occurs within
the context of an employment relationship. This is true because there are good
reasons for the law to regard persons as autonomous within the context of political
deliberation, but there are equally good reasons for the law to regard persons as
dependent within the workplace.
Id. Students attending a university, a place they do not govern, where they must remain if
they are to obtain its benefits, and where they must undergo regular tests of competence
based upon standards they do not set, may seem more analogous to "dependent" workers
than to "autonomous" political actors.
221 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990).
222 If the combined first and fourteenth amendment rights of equal liberty require universities to regulate speech while the first amendment right of free speech requires them to
permit it, we are confronted with an analytical analog of the first amendment's protections
of religion (the free exercise clause) and from religion (the (dis)establishment clause). See
Smith, Non Preferentialism:A Response to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245,
245 (1991). Supreme Court performance in this area may not inspire confidence in the ability of judges to strike the correct balance when opposing rights collide on a continuum of
experience. See Gregory & Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not "Them"!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 273, 288-95 & nn.56-58 (1991). But a
"solution" which abdicates the responsibility to make choices and draw lines by simply
weighting one set of rights more strongly than the other is no solution at all.
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duce hard cases and that they may seem-especially to those who
believe that racism, like slavery before it, permanently scars the
nation while it devastates its victims-to protect perpetrators too
much and victims too little.
One way to begin to derive those principles is to consider specific incidents and locate their place on the scale. Among the examples-adapted from reported incidents-that I think cannot be
prohibited are these: (1) students form a White Supremacy Council and hold meetings on the campus lawn at which they display a
swastika, protest affirmative action admissions and the presence of
nonwhite students on a campus that is one-fifth nonwhite, and use
racial epithets to express their feelings and opinions; (2) white students draw a blackface cartoon of the composer Beethoven and
post it on the bulletin board in a predominantly black dormitory;
(3) black students tear the posted cartoon down; (4) in a classroom
discussion of biological differences between the sexes, a male student contends that women's brains are insufficiently compartmentalized to permit first-rate analytical thought.
Among the examples-also adapted from reported incidents-that I think may be properly prohibited are these: (5)
someone enters the room of two black college students and scrawls
a note on the mirror inside, "African monkeys, why don't you go
back to the jungle?" (6) a group of white male students follows a
black female student across campus, shouting racist and sexist epithets and suggesting the possibility of imminent sexual assault; (7)
a fraternity selects a particular woman as "Jewish American Princess" and ridicules her over the loudspeaker at a football game; (8)
a student (of either sex) corners a male student in a library hallway and harangues him for organizing a gay rights group on campus, using no epithets but hostile words that demean his sexual
orientation.
All of these incidents exemplify the persistence and virulence
of racism, sexism, and homophobia. All of them poison the campus
climate for members of the targeted groups. Allowing any of them
to occur, especially without regulation or reprisal, may inflict some
of the very harms that compromise or destroy equal educational
rights-even if university officials take the opportunity to condemn
the incidents and the views they express as incompatible with both
democracy and education.2 23 But the first four-the ones that I

'23 The National ACLU

policy, the Carnegie Foundation Report, and some scholars ar-
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would permit-share several important characteristics of protected
speech. In particular, even when they involve insulting or stigmatizing words, they are part of the ongoing debate about democratic
self-governance. They may expose iniquities committed (or so the
speaker believes) in the name of racial or sexual equality. They
may stimulate intellectual inquiry into their basis (or lack thereof)
in provable fact or respectable opinion. And they may powerfully
express the speaker's feelings and validate his or her identity in a
way that no less harmful alternative can match.
224
The first example is simply the famous Nazis-in-Skokie case
translated to the campus setting, minus the extra emotional impact derived from the Village of Skokie's high percentage of Holo-

caust survivors; however, it substitutes a substantial racial minority student population who are likely to suffer similar emotional
devastation, and accompanies the Nazi swastika with racial epithets. Despite this incident's virulent racism and its potentially destructive impact on the university community, the white
supremacists are engaging in the campus analog of public political
speech, disseminating ideas to willing listeners and to indifferent
or unwilling passersby (who presumably can, however, evade or ignore the message2 2 5 ). They are not directly inciting anyone to viogue that the proper role for the university in response to racist speech is to permit it while
denouncing it and seeking to counter it by means other than regulating speech. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 181, at 21-23; Linzer, supra note 17, at 236-44; Strossen, supra
note 8, at 564. Thus, the National ACLU policy declares that "[c]olleges and universities
have an affirmative obligation to combat racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of
bias, and a responsibility to provide equal opportunities through education." Id. at 572 (appendix). It then urges each university (among other actions) "to utilize every opportunity to
communicate through its administrators, faculty, and students its commitment to the elimination of all forms of bigotry on campus" and "to develop comprehensive plans aimed at
reducing prejudice, responding promptly to incidents of bigotry and discriminatory harassment, and protecting students from any such further incidents." See id. I cannot help but
hear a submerged note of complacent hypocrisy in all of this well-meant exhortation; when
we really care about harms in our society, we usually outlaw them. But I concede that the
case for exception is especially strong when constitutional norms push us toward
deregulation.
224 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)
(village ordinances aimed at barring Nazi march violate first amendment ban on contentbased speech restrictions). The Nazis cancelled their Skokie rally after winning in court;
they marched instead in downtown Chicago and near their headquarters in Marquette Park.
See D. DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 78-81
(1985).
225 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (requiring
offended bystanders to look or move elsewhere rather than curtailing speech in public area);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (same).
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lence or targeting any particular individual for assaultive speech.
By hypothesis, unbigoted students and victims of prejudice have
equal opportunities to use the same or an equally accessible quasipublic space to disseminate equally passionate opposition (Brandeis's "more speech" remedy2 26 ). As for the racial epithets and the
swastika,2 I cannot find a way to ban them without embracing
values of civility that I think the first amendment implicitly rejects.2 2 On the deeper moral issue, polite racism seems no less
damaging to the victims' self-esteem and educational rights.2 29 And
Mark Antony's speech in Julius Caesar, s0 making the word
"honourable" into an epithet, demonstrates the almost infinite
flexibility of words in context, casting some doubt on our ability to
know when an epithet is being used or created. First amendment
skepticism about official discretion arguably tips the balance. It
seems better-though perhaps only marginally better-to try to
ensure full play for the creative possibilities for angry, vituperative
23 1
replies than to restrict the speakers' use of epithets and symbols.
228 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled
on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
22 The Stanford policy prohibits the "use of insulting or 'fighting' words or non-verbal

symbols" if they are "intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
national and ethnic orgin" and are "addressed directly to the individual or individuals"

insulted or stigmatized. See

STANFORD INTERPRETATION,

supra note 17, at 1. Although the

Stanford policy thus would not ban the example given (because no individual or small group
is singled out for vilification), its focus on particular words and symbols could discourage
their use even in campus "public" forums. That might improve both the intellectual content
and the civility of college life, but it still seems to risk impoverishing political speech without significantly deterring prejudice.
228 See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (majoritarian disapproval or viewers' distaste for
sexually-referenced profanity did not transform wearing jacket inscribed "Fuck the Draft"
into nonprotected expression).
229 See Note, Racism, supra note 10, at 323-25. But see Delgado, supra note 17 (racial
insults remain pervasive mode of communicating dicriminatory attitude).
2'0 W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act. III, sc. ii, 11.72-101, 118-39,
210-32 (1623) (T. Dorsch ed. 1955).
231 I nonetheless agree with Professor Lawrence and others that there is a qualitative
difference between epithets directed at whites (honky, gringo, etc.), even white ethnic
groups that have suffered serious prejudice, and those directed at the most severely dispossessed racial minorities (I do not provide examples because I prefer not to use these words,
even in an academic context, unless there is some truly compelling reason), women, or gays
and lesbians. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 10, at 455-56 (because of unequal "power relationships," dominant racial and sexual groups do not experience the same shock, fear, and
disorientation when denounced because of their group membership). As a white woman who
stayed in the civil rights movement long enough to suffer occasional black rejection, including the use of anti-white and anti-female epithets, I felt the difference. The history and
context of asymmetrical oppression produce asymmetrical meanings. It is another instance
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The second and third examples are variations on the Beethoven incident at Stanford.23 2 The second one is permissible because-just barely-it still constitutes a contribution to the campus analog of public dialogue about race and racism. My response
would change, however, if the cartoon were posted in a particular
student's room or on her door, or addressed to her-especially if
she were singled out as the one who informed the whites of Beethoven's black ancestry. That crosses the line to become targeted
harassment of a particular individual, which I think can always be
prohibited, especially when it involves an invasion of the student's
dormitory room, her campus home. Posting the cartoon in the
quasi-public area of a predominantly black dormitory-just
barely-makes it a provocative statement, and a collective assault
rather than a personal one. But it's a close question. The balance
may tip the other way if the dormitory is very small, if the inhabitants are exclusively black, if they constitute a tiny and isolated
fraction of the student body, or if the incident occurs in a context
of severe or pervasive racial intimidation on the particular campus.
The third example simply acknowledges that provocative
statements can be answered and that rules against a "heckler's
veto"23 3 should not be extended to preclude effective responses by
the victims of racism. The fourth example illustrates first amendment protection of the classroom as a place where students, in pursuit of knowledge, must be permitted to discover error. It too illustrates an opportunity for more speech-this time perhaps more
compelling, because more immediate-in a setting where the university can (and under the fourteenth amendment may be required
to234 ) structure the classroom framework for discussion to encompass the perspective of sexism's or racism's victims.
The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth examples all share several
important characteristics that contradict the asserted values of
free expression. Even if they contribute in some doubtful way to
political, moral, or cultural debate or to the perpetrator's self-realization, they neither advance knowledge, seek truth, expose governof the non-neutral matrix of politics and law.
12 See supra note 11.
233 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 591-92 (1969) (hostile audience may not
curb speaker's first amendment rights). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 852-56
(dicussing pros and cons of "heckler's veto").
234I realize that the concept of academic freedom and the values that it promotes may
complicate this requirement.
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ment abuses, initiate dialogue, encourage participation, further tolerance of divergent views, nor enhance the victim's individual
dignity or self-respect. In addition, they often inflict real, immediate, and irreparable harms. The speakers target a particular individual or a small group of individuals for intimidation or harassment on the basis of membership in a group whose identifying
characteristic-sex, race, religion, and sexual orientation-has
often been used by governments and other dominant actors to degrade and deny the equal humanity of those who belong to the
disfavored group.23 5 In the fifth example, the speakers invade the
victims' home, destroy their sense of physical and psychological security, and forcibly confront them with prejudice transformed
from group defamation to individual verbal abuse. In the sixth example, the speakers hurl words as weapons of assault, and impliedly threaten further, direct, immediate, or serious physical violence from which the victim may, or may not, be able to escape.23 6
In the seventh example, the victim's home is not invaded, nor (by
hypothesis) is she subjected to fear for her physical safety. But
whether or not she is actually present in the football stadium when
her name is announced, the speakers have selected her for potentially crippling psychic injury, inflicted in a public setting where
the harm is immediate and the supposed anodyne of more speech
23 7
is, in any practical sense, both irrelevant and totally foreclosed.
Thus, the harm is greater than if the victims were targeted on the basis of other
STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 2, comment 1
(harassment based on such characteristics as race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation reinforces "socially pervasive invidious discrimination" and is historically linked to physical
violence).
Neither my proposals nor the Stanford policy would prohibit the racist speech that led
to the recent, widely reported expulsion of a Brown University student, because his remarks
would not consitute harassment directed at any particular individual. See Battling Bias,
Campuses Face Free Speech Fight, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at B9, col. 1; Student at
Brown Is Expelled Under a Rule Barring 'Hate Speech,' N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1991, at A17,
col. 1.
213 Cf. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15 (1975) ("rape
. . . is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep
all women in a state of fear") (emphasis in original).
237 This example is distinguishable from Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50
(1988), because the victim-who also differs because she is a private individual, not a public
figure-suffers not just individual emotional harm, but discriminatory harassment that interferes with her educational rights. Comparing the cases demonstrates the practical effect
of shifting the line between protected and unprotected speech in order to protect victims
against harassment that is based on suspect characteristics like sex and religion, occurs in
the university setting, and is inflicted in a manner that makes serious interference with
equal education virtually inevitable.

personal characteristics. See

1991]

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The eighth incident is more troubling, and may seem closer in
nature to the first four. The victim is not confronted in his home,
not threatened with physical violence, not subjected to public humiliation, and may have a chance to reply. But (again, by hypothesis) he is an unwilling listener subjected to direct, face-to-face verbal assault based upon his activities and his sexual orientation.
Even if this speech verges on .the political, it still constitutes
targeted verbal harassment of a particular individual because of a
personal characteristic that has been treated as despicable by political majorities (and even by the Supreme Court 23 s). He is, at
least momentarily, an unwilling captive listener 239 whose own
rights to self-determination and to educational equality are devalued if we insist that he absorb the psychic harm to protect the
freedom of the perpetrator.
In the last four examples, each of the speakers acts intentionally-not casually or negligently-for the purpose of inflicting
harm on the victims. In each instance, a reasonable observer would
be likely-even compelled-to conclude that the expression involved is almost certain not only to inflict serious psychological injury, but to interfere with the victim's educational rights. A theory
of the first amendment that justifies privileging such speech by reference to values of content or viewpoint neutrality is vulnerable to
the charge that, whatever its abstract virtues, in the real world it
promotes prejudice, constraint, and conformity rather than tolerance, liberty, and diversity. In the name of abstract and spurious
gains for free speech and democracy, it permits and even encourages the infliction of devastating, unnecessary, and unjust harms
on real people. 240 Regulation of the last four examples of the cate238

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (refusing to find constitutional

protection for nonheterosexual intimacy); cf. Black, Unnamed Human Rights in the States,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 17, 49 & n.52 (1991).
239 Cf. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (treating bus passengers as
"captive audience" unable to leave without suffering unreasonable losses). Arguably, the
harassed student has a basic right to remain on campus without suffering this harm. If he
may walk away without being followed or taunted, however, the first amendment may require him to do so. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1975).
240 Even Professor Tribe, generally an advocate of broad first amendment freedoms,
believes in some limits:
The Constitution may well allow punishment for speaking words that cause hurt
just by their being uttered and heard.... [A] commitment to protect evenhandedly the expression of all sentiments should not degenerate from an abiding faith
in the first amendment to an obsession with alluring abstractions or neutral principles. The first amendment need not sanctify the deliberate infliction of pain sim-
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gory of prejudiced speech fulfills the balancing test: it is necessary
to further the compelling interest in protecting the victims' first
and fourteenth amendment rights to equal liberty and equal

education.241
By inductive reasoning, then, we can generalize principles to
apply to future cases. Universities may prohibit and punish direct
verbal assaults on specific individuals-severe or pervasive harassment based on membership in a group whose identifying characteristic is practically or historically linked to serious and persistent
prejudice 242 -if the speaker intends to do harm and if a reasonable
ply because the vehicle used is verbal or symbolic rather than physical.
L. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 856.
211 Cf. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (viewpoint-based
speech regulation is unconstitutional unless compelling state interest is demonstrated).
242 The categories included in the California ACLU policy are sex, race, disability, religion, sexual orientation, alienage, and national or ethnic origin.
The policy, a document drafted by a committee and redrafted as it was enacted by
three separate ACLU affiliate boards of directors, does not precisely reflect my views even
though I helped to write it. As this Article goes to press, the policy is under review. In its
current form, a preliminary statement declares that universities "should not bar the ability
of professors to teach their philosophies or students to express their views no matter how
offensive, but must instead focus on speech or expression used as a weapon to harass specific
victims." See ACLU of California, Policy Concerning Harassment on College Campuses
(1990).
The ACLU policy itself states:
Campus administrators are obligated to take all steps necessary within constitutional bounds to minimize and eliminate a hostile educational environment which
impairs access of protected minorities to equal educational opportunities. Campus
administrators must: speak out vigorously against expressions of hatred or contempt based on race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, national or ethnic origin,
alienage, or disability; promote equality and mutual accommodation and understanding among these groups and the balance of the community (including steps
to assure diversity within the faculty, administration, staff, and student body and
to incorporate into the curriculum and extra-curricular activities educational efforts to reduce racism and other forms of discrimination); and eliminate discriminatory educational policies, practices and procedures that exist on the campuses.
Campus administrators may not, however, enact campus codes of conduct prohibiting discriminatory harassment of students on the basis of speech or expression
unless at a minimum all of the following conditions are met:
1. The code of conduct reaches only speech or expression that:
a) is specifically intended to and does harass an individual or specific
individuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion, sexual orientation,
national or ethnic origin, alienage, or disability;
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it harasses; and
c) creates a hostile and intimidating environment which the speaker
knows or reasonably should know will seriously and directly impede the
educational opportunities of the individual or individuals to whom it is
directly addressed.

1991]

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

person would recognize the potential for serious interference with
the victim's educational rights. I would add further limiting principles as well: that sanctions, proportionate to the harm intended
and done, may be imposed only when they are the least restrictive
means available to discourage prejudiced harassment; that harassment must be clearly evident to an objective observer, that the incident or incidents must be highly likely to produce serious psychological harm and a hostile or intimidating educational
environment; and that university regulations must be accompanied
by specific illustrations of punishable harassment that warn students in advance of the types of expressive acts that fall within the
prohibited zone. In doubtful cases, a presumption in favor of free
speech should prevail.2 43 In any event, regulations that prohibit
prejudiced expression directed at individual students should not
limit campus debates, speeches, or demonstrations, classroom discussions, or conversations among students, unless the circumstances clearly show that the speakers intentionally singled out
particular individuals for discriminatory harassment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Everything I have written here is open to misinterpretation. It
is not easy to relinquish the heroic ideal of the first amendment
guarantee of free speech, or to acknowledge that our society and
our laws too often have chosen the victims of prejudice and injustice to carry the burdens of that ideal. Even to suggest reimagining
the first amendment is, in some circles, tantamount to heresy. The
regulations I propose are easy to attack from a traditional libertarian perspective; cries of vagueness, overbreadth, and chilling effect
2. The code of conduct is enforced in a manner consistent with due process protections (including the right of any individual charged with violation to notice and
a hearing), contains specific illustrations of expected occurrences which demonstrate when the policy does or does not apply, is proportionate to the gravity of
the violation, and does not impose prior restraint upon expression.
Id. at 2-3.
143I recognize that this limitation risks moving the line between protected and unprotected speech back toward its hypothesized original position and tolerating racist or other
prejudiced speech that should, in fact, be forbidden. I include it because I think university
regulations in this complex area of constitutional rights should incorporate a "tiebreaker"
that favors traditional notions of free speech when the factfinder is unable in good faith to
locate the place on the continuum where the victim's fundamental rights supersede those of
the speaker. I believe that if we try, in most instances we can distinguish discriminatory
verbal harassment from merely "offensive or disagreeable" speech. The persistence of racism, sexism, and homophobia make the effort a moral imperative.
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can be heard not far in the distance. From the perspective of the
victims of prejudiced speech, however, my performance may seem
to fall short of my original premise: I have declared bold new visions of constitutional rights and offered only a timid and limited
implementation of them-a pattern of injustice that the victims of
racism have seen before. This discussion about the meaning and
interplay of constitutional rights and moral values is an unfinished
project.
But it does mean this much: that even as a liberal and a civil
libertarian, I believe we are long overdue to recognize that the social and individual interests in deterring racism, sexism, and similar prejudices and in ensuring that college students have a true and
equal opportunity to learn are at least as important as the interests
in preventing criminal behavior, physical violence, or employment
discrimination that have already been found sufficient to justify
limited regulation of free expression. We can expand our vision of
the first amendment beyond the libertarian paradigm-the speaker
as the victim of governmental repression-to acknowledge a more
complicated world. We can regulate speech to combat the harms
done when speakers themselves perpetuate prejudice and repression: silencing the voices of targeted victims, undermining equality,
and decreasing both individual liberty and democratic dialogue. A
more complex theory of free speech, informed by social context
and lived experience, can take the harms of racist speech seriously
and allow us to weave a remedy into our continuing constitutional
story of individual rights.
Nothing in my proposal would change the calculus of benefits
and burdens in most areas of first amendment law. Outside the
campus, when fourteenth amendment concerns are not present to
reinforce first amendment values of equality and when the targets
of discriminatory speech may ignore or evade it without sacrificing
their own rights, democratic pluralism and liberal theory would triumph as before. The Village of Skokie would still be required to
permit Nazis to march and chant their racist slogans in the public
streets. The State of Alabama would still have to endure the
March on Selma and the searing eloquence of Martin Luther King,
Jr. The United States and its states and cities and towns would
still be prohibited from censoring raucous musicians, irreverent
artists, deceitful politicians, pornographic publishers, or demonstrators against wars in Indochina or the Persian Gulf. And the
university would have to countenance them all-unless they pur-
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sue their message by targeting specific individuals for harassment
that threatens to destroy the fourteenth amendment right to educational equality and the first amendment right to equal liberty
and equal voice.
That may not be enough to exorcise Banquo's ghost. But it is
a beginning.

